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The American law generally regards the “bundle of rights” as property’s
dominant metaphor. On this conception of property, ownership empowers an individual
to control a particular resource in any number of ways. For example, he may use it,
transfer it, exclude others from it, divide it, and perhaps even destroy it.1 The various
rights in the bundle, however, are not equal in terms of importance. To the contrary,
American courts and commentators have deemed the “right to exclude” foremost among
the property rights, with the Supreme Court characterizing it as the “hallmark of a
protected property interest”2 and leading property scholars describing the right as the
core, or the essential element, of ownership.3 Yet for all its centrality, in the minds of
courts and legal scholars, there is substantial conceptual confusion about the nature of the
“right to exclude.” This confusion manifests itself in the form of inconsistent judicial
opinions and unsatisfying commentary on those opinions.
Discussions of a unitary “right to exclude” in Property law obscure more than they
reveal, in part because scholars of exclusion have focused entirely on pure in rem
exclusion rights protected by trespass law without exploring the interactions of those
exclusion rights that are not protected by trespass law. In my view, it is more helpful to
think about exclusion more broadly, so as to encompass those rights that are not
themselves founded on trespass law, but that can nevertheless substitute for trespassbased exclusion rights. Exclusion, in these terms, includes property owners’ efforts to
exclude third parties from his resource, as well as the third parties’ decisions to exclude
themselves from the owner’s resource.
Broadly conceived in this manner, the right to exclude can be unbundled into its four
component rights:4 (1) The Hermit’s Right (the right to keep everyone off the resource
owners’ property); (2) The Bouncer’s Right (the right to admit third parties selectively to
the resource owners’ property); (3) The Exclusionary Vibe (the right to convey messages
about who is welcome or unwelcome on the property, enforced primarily by social and
psychological sanctions); and (4) The Exclusionary Amenity (the right to embed
polarizing and costly club goods on the resource owners’ property in order to sort
between desirable and undesirable entrants).5 Though the first two rights are enforced via
1

A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 114-18 (A.G. Guest ed. 1961).
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673
(1999). This language arguably elevated the status of the right to exclude beyond the Court’s earlier
characterization of it as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property.” Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)
3
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 2 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954); Thomas W.
Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEBRASKA L. REV. 730, 740-52 (1998); Richard A. Epstein,
“More” or “Less” Maximal Conceptions of Property: An Essay in Memory of Jim Harris, at 39
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also Honore, supra note 1, at 114 (suggesting that
humans are hardwired to want to exclude others from their property).
4
Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 13, 13 (1985) (noting that the right to exclude “is not one right; it is itself a collection or
‘bundle’ of rights” but applying this insight to the divergent nature of exclusion rights in the trespass and
nuisance contexts). On the bundle of rights metaphor, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); and Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1911).
5
This nomenclature has not appeared previously in the legal literature. A classic Bob Ellickson article
noted the right-to-exclude’s importance to hermits and other idiosyncratic types who were extremely
protective of their own privacy. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1353-54
2
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trespass law, the latter three rights are substitutes for each other, such that when the law
tries to restrict one right this merely encourages an owner to exercise another.
The potential substitutability of trespass-based and nontrespass-based exclusion rights
raises an important question that this paper will answer: How does a resource owner
choose which exclusion strategy to adopt? This paper’s most important insight is that
information costs are often the primary factor guiding a resource owner’s decision about
which right to exclude he should exercise in a particular context. More precisely, where a
third party seeking entry has private information about his preferences and behaviors that
the resource owner cannot obtain at a low cost, the resource owner essentially will
delegate the exclusion function to the third party, using either exclusionary vibes or an
exclusionary amenities strategy. Where, by contrast, the third party lacks private
information or the resource owner can obtain the third party’s private information at a
low cost, the resource owner generally will prefer a bouncer’s right strategy.
This paper’s other primary contribution is to show that the government can, and does,
influence resource owners’ preferences among the various rights to exclude, not only
through direct and selective prohibitions on exclusion (like those contained in the Fair
Housing Act) but also through information access regimes, like Megan’s Law and
privacy tort law. By altering the cost structure associated with resource owners’
discovery of third parties’ private information, governmental policies can discourage
resource owners from exercising those exclusion rights that undermine social welfare.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part I begins with a very brief examination of
exclusion more generally, and draws on Henry Smith’s illuminating distinction between
governance and exclusion. The part then breaks down the “right to exclude” into its
component parts, explaining hermit’s exclusion, bouncer’s exclusion, exclusionary vibes,
and exclusionary amenities in more detail. The section concludes by examining the extent
to which these various rights to exclude are substitutes for one another.
Part II explains the framework that resource owners use to decide which of the four
exclusion strategies they will adopt. This part argues that the presence or absence of
private information is the critical heretofore unrecognized factor in this decision. This
part then identifies other considerations, such as the nature of the payoff structure, the
role of law, the social meaning of various exclusion strategies, and the susceptibility of
various exclusion strategies to coordinated action. These considerations may prove
decisive for some resource owners contemplating which exclusion strategies to pursue.
Part III asks when the government should intervene to constrain a resource owners’
choice of a particular exclusion strategy. There are two dimensions to this argument: The
first is an analysis of the negative externalities associated with nonintervention by the
government, and the second is an assessment of the costs associated with government
intervention, such as the costs of correctly identifying a resource owners’ exclusion
(1993). Reinier H. Kraakman introduced the bouncer metaphor in Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a ThirdParty Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. OF L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 63 (1986), though his discussion does not address
property issues, but rather examines the tort liability that bouncers and other gatekeepers might incur if
those admitted engage in wrongdoing on the premises. Id. at 63-64. Typing the phrase “exclusionary vibes”
into Google produces three distinctly nonacademic hits, all of which appear to describe the dominant mood
at various social clubs or restaurants. I coined the phrase “Exclusionary Amenity” in an earlier paper. See
infra note 76.
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strategy and the probability of erroneous judgments by the state. Part III then applies this
framework to evaluate government policies regarding the residence of sex offenders in
residential communities, racial discrimination in the rental market, and voluntary
residential segregation by religious groups.
A brief conclusion is provided in Part IV.

I.

The Rights to Exclude

This Part introduces the four distinct rights to exclude and elaborates on their uses,
importance, and relative merits. Before analyzing the component parts of the right to
exclude, it behooves us to consider the right narrowly, in accordance with orthodox
property scholarship.
A.

Exclusion versus Governance

During the past few years Henry Smith’s keyboard has been the source of the most
fascinating contemporary scholarship in property law. Beginning with an article in the
Journal of Legal Studies,6 Smith has analyzed property regimes as mediating a choice
between two strategies for controlling a resource: governance and exclusion.
Exclusion, in Smith’s framework, refers to “a low-cost, but low-precision, method
that relies on rough informational variables like boundaries to define legal entitlements.”7
When the law grants an owner a right to exclude, it delegates authority over that resource
to an owner or group of owners, who can decide whether to fence it off from the outside
world or allow users to come and go as they please. These are in rem rights, good against
the entire world, and the state will side with the owner where someone seeks to violate
those rights.8
This delegation to the resource owner can be advantageous for a host of reasons: It
assigns the gatekeeper right to the party with the greatest incentive to exercise it in a
wealth-maximizing way; it reduces the need to coordinate among multiple stakeholders
in order to make decisions about how to use the resource; and it may maximize consumer
options if different owners of fungible resources adopt varying exclusion strategies for
optimizing the value of their property. At common law, resource owners’ exclusion rights
tended to maximize their discretion about who to admit, with the important exception of
common carriers, whose monopoly position in the marketplace justified very substantial
limitations on their rights to exclude.9 In the modern era, courts and legislatures have
rendered exclusion rights less absolute, imposing nondiscrimination obligations on
resource owners who lack monopolies, but still conferring upon resource owners
substantial discretion over whom to admit.10
6

Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002).
7
Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 981
(2004).
8
Cohen, supra note 3, at 374.
9
See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE
L.J. 2091, 2118-19 (1997).
10
Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1,
75 (2004); Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 641 n. 108
(1988).
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Smith contrasts the exclusion strategy with governance rules:
At the pole opposite of exclusion along the organizational dimension are
what I am calling governance rules. These rules . . . pick out uses and
users in more detail, imposing a more intense informational burden on a
smaller audience of duty holders. For example, village herdsmen may
have rights to graze animals that are circumscribed as to number of
animals, time of grazing, and so on. . . . [A] wide range of rules, from
contractual provisions, to norms of proper use, to nuisance law and public
environmental regulation can be seen as reflecting the governance
strategy; compared to basic trespass and property law, all these
governance rules require the specification of proper activities.11
Governance, in short, manages a resource, not through blunt access restrictions, but
through sets of rules or standards that regulate the conduct of those who do have access.12
While governance might involve governmental decision-making about uses, exclusion
involves a delegation of authority to the owners of property, with the government acting
only to enforce trespass laws. This distinction is important for my purposes, as shall
become clear below.13
How should society regulate the use of a scarce resource: through an exclusion
regime or a governance regime? Smith argues that the choice hinges on the tradeoffs
between exclusion’s simplicity and governance’s precision:
The exclusion strategy bunches together a lot of uses and does not inquire
into details; it lacks the benefits of precision in terms of maximizing the
value of individual uses, say from specialization by different actors in
different uses of the same asset. At the same time, the exclusion strategy
also avoids the costs of precision. By contrast, governance captures the
benefits of precision but at a higher cost. Governance deals directly with
problems that are left to the owner to handle under exclusion. Thus,

11

Smith, supra note 6, at 454-55.
This point is important. Smith’s exclusion-versus-governance dichotomy is not merely a simple
application to property law of the rules versus standards debate in the legal literature more generally. See
generally Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995). Exclusion can take the form
of a rule or standard. For example, an owner might be empowered to admit only the first 100 customers
seeking entrance, or to admit all men, but no women. Alternatively, an owner might apply a standard for
admission, such as “well dressed patrons may dine here.” By the same token, governance may take the
form of rules, such as “patrons may not smoke in the restaurant,” or standards, such as “patrons engaged in
rowdy or lascivious conduct will be removed from the premises.”
13
More complex governmental efforts to facilitate exclusion by private parties, such as exclusionary
zoning regimes, are appropriately understood as governance mechanisms, notwithstanding the presence of
the word “exclusionary” in the term. This is appropriate, as a government-driven process like exclusionary
zoning is analytically different in kind from the decentralized, individual-rights-oriented exclusion
remedies I discuss in detail below. For discussions of exclusionary and inclusionary zoning, see PETER H.
SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 203-227 (2003); David J.
Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2357-61 (2003); James C. Clingermayer,
Heresthetics and Happenstance: Intentional and Unintentional Exclusionary Impacts of the Zoning
Decision-making Process, 41 URB. STUD. 377 (2003); and Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of
“Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167 (1981).
12
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exclusion and governance have characteristic and different cost (supply)
curves.14
Governance, on this model, is the appropriate response to resource controversies where a
great deal is at stake. In such circumstances, the likely gains from tailoring a set of rules
or norms to the resource in question exceed the (high) costs of creating a governance
regime, communicating the rules of that governance regime to stakeholders, and
resolving any disputes about whether the rules have been followed.15 Where there is little
at stake, relying on blunt exclusion strategies spares society the substantial information
costs associated with governance, and still generates resource allocations that, while
perhaps not optimal, are good enough.
As my comments have already indicated, I believe that Smith has done serious
intellectual heavy lifting in these articles, and his papers should become foundational
texts in short order. It is of course true that, as Smith himself notes, exclusion and
governance are best conceptualized as a continuum of strategies, not mutually exclusive
corner solutions. Indeed, once we start confronting intermediate strategies like
conditional exclusion, we begin to see how the two categories might bleed into each other
readily.16 That said, these caveats neither detract from our ability to characterize
particular strategies as exclusion- or governance-oriented, nor prevent us from making
general statements about exclusion and governance that substantially advance the cause
of property theory. This much is amply demonstrated by Smith’s use of his core insight to
shed substantial light on fundamental theoretical debates in property law, such as the
property-rules versus liability rules framework, the relationship between nuisance law
and trespass law, and the appropriate legal responses to self-help.17
But in the pages that follow, I want to reveal something important that is obscured
by the exclusion-versus-governance dichotomy. Property scholars and students readily
understand that there are enormous institutional differences among governance regimes
like zoning, nuisance, covenants, social norms in close-knit communities, and
environmental regulations, and Smith’s work is sensitive to these differences. In this
paper, I will demonstrate that there is as much diversity among exclusion regimes as
there is among governance regimes, and that some exclusion regimes are just as finegrained and precise as the costliest governance regimes. In any event, now that we
understand what governance is, let me introduce a new typology of exclusion. After
providing the nomenclature, I will explain the analytic payoffs associated with
disaggregating exclusion.

14

Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1756 (2004).
Smith’s analysis of the information costs associated with governance proceeds from a welfarist
perspective. In other words, he would not be satisfied if governance merely shifted the information costs
associated with resource management from the state to an individual owner. Rather, he argues, exclusion
shifts the decision over a resource’s use to the individual who usually can obtain information about that
resource most efficiently – its owner. Smith, supra note 7, at 985.
16
By conditional exclusion I mean a rule that says, “third parties will be permitted to enter Blackacre
as long as they agree to refrain from engaging in activity x.” This exclusion regime in effect mirrors a
governance rule prohibiting activity x enacted by the citizens of Blackacre.
17
See Smith, supra note 7; Smith, supra note 14; and Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of
Property (American Law and Economics Association Annual Meetings Working Paper No. 18) (2005).
15
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B.

The Hermit’s Right

The traditional account of the property right to exclude emphasizes a solitary,
isolated individual who excludes all third parties from his land.18 This is the hermit’s
property right. Framed so narrowly, it seems to be a right of little value. Few people want
to live permanently in total isolation.19 Rather, the prospect of hosting friends, neighbors,
relatives, and service providers on one’s property for visits of varying durations is a large
part of what makes land ownership valuable. Although the assertion of a hermit’s right is
rather uncontroversial in the residential context,20 the law will not let any man truly
become an island. Hence the hermit’s land may be invaded by another who can raise a
necessity defense to trespass,21 and public agents like firemen or police officers in hot
pursuit may be privileged to enter the hermit’s land.22
The hermit’s right, then, is perhaps only useful in a few real property situations.
Surely a true recluse will value his solitude. But beyond that, most uses of the hermit’s
right will be governmental. The state might establish a protected wilderness area for
conservation or wildlife protection reasons, or it may create a minefield as a way to
prevent invaders (or anyone else) from traversing a strategic space. Alternatively, the
state may embrace paternalistic justifications for a rule that excludes everyone. For
example, a government that owns a site where nuclear weapons have been tested may
want to prevent anyone from setting foot on the property in question.
Intuitively, profit-making enterprises will have little use for a strict keep-out
regime. It is difficult to make a profit off land if its owner will allow neither customers
nor employees to set foot on it. We can expect to see firms utilizing their hermit’s right
only in those rare circumstances where permitting entry onto the land might expose them
to substantial legal liability, as with a toxic waste dump that cannot be cleaned up in a
cost effective manner, or when utilizing the hermit’s right arises out of a conflict between
management and labor (i.e., a lockout).23
In light of the very narrow circumstances in which private land owners seek to
assert the hermit’s right, it is appropriate to deem this right to exclude as practically
trivial, except where legitimate, altruistic conservation interests arise. Permanent isolation
is usually so unappealing that virtually no one in their right mind aspires to it. The proof
for this assertion is in the pudding. It is almost impossible to locate a reported case that
implicates the hermit’s right and involves land that has positive economic value but little

18

Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2005).
Stephen R. Munzer, Property as Social Relations, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY OF PROPERTY 36, 40 (Stephen R. Munzer ed. 2001); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Is Land Special? The
Unjustified Preference for Landownership in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227, 257-60
(2004).
20
Gerald E. Frug, The Legal Technology of Exclusion 2 (unpublished working paper, on file with
author).
21
Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW.
U. L. REV. 1283, 1465 (1996).
22
See, e.g., Pearson v. Canada Contracting Co., Inc., 349 S.E.2d 106, 110 (Va. 1986).
23
See Susan L. Dolin, Lockouts in Evolutionary Perspective: The Changing Balance of Power in
American Industrial Relations, 12 VT. L. REV. 335, 342 (1987); Kent Greenfield, There’s a Forest in Those
Trees: Teaching About the Roles of Corporations in Society, 34 GA. L. REV. 1011, 1020-24 (2000).
19
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environmental value. The closest American case, Brown v. Burdett,24 involves a testator’s
wishes that her home be bricked and boarded up “with good long nails” for twenty years
following the testator’s death, a will provision that the court invalidated on public policy
grounds.25 So while the hermit’s right perhaps retains importance in philosophical
discussions of real property rights, its practical import is sufficiently minimal so as to
warrant little more discussion here.26
C.

The Bouncer’s Right

Once we move away from extreme and economically unproductive exercises of
the right to exclude, we arrive quickly at rights that take on enormous economic
importance. As soon as an owner wishes to allow third parties onto his property at certain
times of day, or admit some third parties while refusing entry to others, or establish some
criteria that will govern entry onto the land, he is exercising the sort of discretion that
makes the right to exclude valuable. The greater power to exclude may include the lesser
power, but it is the lesser power that takes on greater importance.27 Moreover, while the
hermit’s right and the bouncer’s right are mutually exclusive, the latter three rights in the
bundle are not. Indeed, the bouncer’s right, exclusionary vibes, and exclusionary
amenities often will be used conjunctively by a resource owner.
The bouncer’s right, then, is the landowner’s right to discriminate among various
third parties, permitting some to enter or use the land while keeping others off the
property entirely. Like the bouncer at a night club, the owner must exercise discretion as
to who can utilize the resource, and the criteria for exclusion need not be transparent to
those seeking admission. There are commercial and noncommercial variations on the
bouncer’s right, but they are analytically similar. A business owner will value the right to
admit some customers and vendors but not others, whereas a homeowner will care about
his right to invite friends and family into his home while excluding foes.
Why does the bouncer’s right have so much importance? Precisely because that
right can replace the narrowly tailored but costly governance regimes used to solve
common pool problems. Setting aside certain fugitive resources, such as air, that do not
lend themselves to exclusion-oriented strategies, exclusion invariably emerges as an
alternative to governance for regulating the way in which a collective resource is
exploited. A landowner can admit all comers and then control their use of a common
resource through governance (e.g., via zoning laws or environmental regulations), or the
24

21 Ch. D. 667 (1882).
I have argued elsewhere for greater symmetry in the law’s treatment of purportedly anti-social
impulses by living owners and dead ones. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L. J.
781, 839-52 (2005).
26
The hermit’s right may be more attractive in cases involving chattel property. For example, many
people keep diaries and then exclude all others from seeing those diaries. The interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of a diary’s contents is a more understandable version of the overly pronounced desire for
privacy that might prompt a hermit to try to keep everyone off his land.
27
At first glance, the right to engage in fine-grained exclusion might appear to follow logically from
the right to engage in blunt exclusion: If an owner can refuse entry to everyone, he can surely refuse entry
to some. This greater-power-includes-the-lesser-power argument does not resonate, however. Exclusion
often imposes harms on third parties who are excluded from using a particular resource. These burdens
associated with exclusion may be palatable, on distributional grounds, if they are distributed in a neutral
way, but unpalatable if they are distributed in ways that conflict with egalitarian public policy
commitments.
25
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landowner can be selective about who gets to use the resource, weeding out undesirable
uses of the resource by refusing to admit those third parties deemed likely to engage in
the undesirable uses. The choice for a real estate developer, for instance, is between
controlling what his residents do and controlling who his residents are. The more
effective the real estate developer’s selection mechanism, the less need there will be for
costly governance mechanisms.28 Moreover, as I will argue below, there is a large
universe of common pool problems, such as those in which the importance of human
nature dominates nurture, those that implicate serious agency problems, and those in
which individuals will resist what they perceive as social engineering, where exclusion is
inherently a far better strategy than governance.
The vast majority of published cases purporting to implicate “the right to exclude”
seem to involve landowners’ efforts to employ the bouncer’s right, not the hermit’s right.
I will discuss an illustrative New Jersey case, which involved the first major legal
challenge to an increasingly prevalent exclusion strategy.
1.

Sex Offender Residency Restrictions

During recent years, American society has focused great attention on the
problems surrounding sex offenders who have served their time and been released into
the community. These concerns have manifested themselves in the enactment of Megan’s
Laws at the state and federal level, which require released sex offenders to register their
home addresses with the state.29 Many states publicize the addresses of sex offenders on
web sites, and through other means, often publishing offenders’ photographs and other
relevant information.30 More recently, states have enacted legislation that provides for
24-hour electronic monitoring of high-risk sex offenders who have completed their terms
and been released into the community.31
In the wake of the new laws directed at sex offenders, homeowners associations
and other common-interest-communities have recorded covenants prohibiting the sale of
homes to registered sex offenders.32 In Mulligan v. Panther Valley Property Owners
28

There is an extensive literature on selection effects in organizational and jurisdictional settings. See,
e.g., J. Luis Guasch & Andrew Weiss, Self-Selection in the Labor Market, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 275 (1981);
Robert Nakosteen & Michael Zimmer, Migration and Income: The Question of Self Selection, 46
SOUTHERN ECON. J. 840 (1980). In the land use setting, Nicole Stelle Garnett has identified “neighborhoodexclusion strategies,” whereby municipal governments try to control the drug problem, not only through
aggressive police actions, but also through policies designed to retain or attract law-abiding citizens while
causing drug dealers and users to move elsewhere. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Relocating Disorder, 91 VA.
L. REV. 1075, 1121-22 (2005).
29
See 42 U.S.C. § 14071; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-1 et seq. (West 2004). Congress acted after many
states had enacted their own versions of Megan’s Law, and this congressional action “effectively
mandate[ed]” that the remaining states follow suit. See Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension
of Megan’s Law, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1535, 1546 (2004).
30
The Iowa registry is particularly sophisticated, permitting easy searching and providing a wealth of
biographical data about offenders. See http://iowasexoffender.com .
31
See, e.g., Jessica Lunsford Act, Fla. House Bill 1877 (enacted 2005), A.P., States Track Sex
Offenders by GPS, Wired (July 30, 2005), available in
<http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,68372,00.html> (visited Sep. 26, 2005).
32
Mulligan v. Panther Valley Property Owners Ass’n, 766 A.2d 1186, 1192 (N.J. App. Div. 2001);
Henry Gottlieb, Fighting a Local Ban on Sex Criminals, NAT. L.J., May 17, 1999, at A7; Robert Hanley,
Condominiums Consider Barring Some Paroled Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1998, at B1.
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Association, the only published legal challenge to such a regime, a resident of one
association challenged its prohibition on the sale of her property to Tier 3 sex offenders.33
Tier 3 sex offenders are those who, the state has determined, pose a high risk of
recidivism.34 The court refused to invalidate the relevant covenants, finding that because
there were only 80 Tier 3 registrants living in New Jersey at the time of the litigation, the
restriction did not constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation.35 The Mulligan court
had a harder time determining whether the restrictions were contrary to public policy.36
The court seemed to sympathize with the desire of residents to protect themselves from
sexual predators, but expressed worries about what would happen if most homeowners
associations in New Jersey mimicked Panther Valley’s policies. The court held that the
restrictions did not violate public policy at present, but noted that it would revisit the
issue if sex offenders had too few residential options in the future.37
Bouncer’s exclusion seems like an intuitive strategy for a residential community
whose residents want to reduce their susceptibility to sex crimes. Although there is a
scholarly debate about the level of recidivism for sex offenses and the frequency with
which sex offenders prey on strangers,38 the presence of convicted offenders seems to
raise serious alarm among neighbors, such that targeting sex offenders for exclusion may
be a rational response for some homeowners associations.39 So let us situate ourselves in
the shoes of the Panther Valley Property Owners’ Association and review the various
strategies that it could use to protect itself against these sorts of crimes.
Panther Valley’s decision to record the covenant restraining residence by sex
offenders precluded it from making exceptions to its exclusion policy on a case-by-case
basis, as any owner of a home in Panther Valley would have had standing to enforce the
covenant if another owner violated it.40 Hence Panther Valley’s choice of strategies
seems like a clear instance of bouncer’s exclusion. The association merely took away the
bouncer’s discretion, and forced him to apply a straightforward bright-line rule.

33

Mulligan, 766 A.2d at 1192.
Id. at 1189.
35
Id. at 1192.
36
Id. at 1192-94.
37
Id. at 1193-94.
38
For a quick overview of the conflicting studies of recidivism rates, see Peter T. Wendel, The Case
Against Plea Bargaining Child Sexual Abuse Charges: “Déjà vu All Over Again,” 64 MO. L. REV. 317, 331
n.46 (1999). For a more comprehensive analysis of the literature, see John M. Fabian, Kansas v. Hendricks,
Crane, and Beyond, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1367, 1426-33 (2003). For a summary of the studies
regarding sexual molestation by strangers versus relatives and acquaintances, see Leonore M.J. Simon, Sex
Offender Legislation and the Antitherapeutic Effects on Victims, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 485, 490 n. 21 (1999).
39
Alternatively, these restrictions may be insufficiently exclusionary in that sex offenders are excluded
from residing in the community, but not excluded from entering the community. The calculus here involves
a straightforward cost benefit analysis whereby a community would weigh the cost of doing background
checks whenever someone enters a community as a visitor against the anticipated decrease in sex offenses
associated with such a policy.
40
In New Jersey, as in other states, any property owner whose land is benefited by a covenant has
standing to sue to enforce it. See Syrian Antiochian Orthodox Archdiocese of New York v. Palisades
Assoc., 264 A.2d 257, (N.J. Super. Ct. 1970). See generally Susan F. French, Highlights of the New
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 225, 231 (2000) (describing
the law of standing to enforce covenants more generally).
34
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It is possible that Panther Valley could have opted for a governance regime
instead of its bouncer’s restriction on Tier 3 registrants residing in the community.
Indeed, a number of possible governance systems spring to mind in this instance, some of
them ordinary and some quite unorthodox. For example, the community could invest in
traditional law enforcement strategies, like hiring constables to deter and detect sexual
offenses. With the consent of its residents it could install ubiquitous video surveillance
cameras in the interiors of homes as well as in public spaces. More provocatively, the
association might arm those identified as likely targets of sex offenses and authorize them
to use deadly force if they feel threatened. Or the association could use insurance markets
to address this problem, requiring that all those who enter the community provide a bond,
whose proceeds shall be forfeited to the victim if the entrant was subsequently convicted
of a sex offense. As should be readily apparent from these examples, governance
strategies seem poorly suited to addressing the danger of sex offenses in Panther Valley.
The various governance regimes impose substantial privacy costs, economic costs,
personal injury risks, or administrative burdens on the community’s residents. Among the
strategies we have discussed so far, excluding the likely sex offenders from Panther
Valley, while allowing everyone else who can afford to purchase a home to do so, seems
to be the cost-effective approach to this problem, especially given the fact that a very
small number of prospective Panther Valley residents pose any risk of becoming sex
offenders. The lesson here is that bouncer’s exclusion strategies can provide more precise
and far more efficient solutions to problems than governance.
This idea should surprise no one. It is implicit in agency theory, for example,
where scholars have long understood that the most cost effective way to prevent a store’s
night watchman from robbing the owner blind is not necessarily to watch the watchman’s
every move while on the job or to provide him with a compensation package that allies
his interest with that of the owner’s, but to try to hire an honest watchman.41
2.

The Greek System

Suppose a group of college students wishes to maximize some subjective variable
within a communal residence. That variable might be physical attractiveness, athletic
prowess, intelligence, or sociability. Governance will not work particularly well here,42
absent some means of exclusion (beyond the university’s admissions requirements). If the
community has no control over membership composition, then it cannot expect its
residents to be any more attractive, athletic, smart, or fun than the average student at its
institution. Because of the desire to shape the character of the community, some students
devote substantial resources to obtaining information about those who wish to join their
communities, and offer admission only to those applicants who convince the majority of

41

See Edgar Kiser, Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and
Sociology: An Illustration from State Policy Implementation, 17 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 146, 149-50
(1999) The Ottoman Turk’s selection of eunuchs to guard harems was an extreme (and extremely effective)
use of selection effects to solve a principle-agent problem. See Richard Sherr, Gugliemo Gonzaga and the
Castrati, 33 RENAISSANCE Q. 33, 47 (1980).
42
Governance strategies for maximizing the members’ desirability with respect to these characteristics
might include mandatory plastic surgery or sessions with a personal trainer or personality coach.
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current residents that they would make good housemates. This is an apt description of the
pledge and rush processes in the “Greek system” of a typical American university.43
Although both the Panther Valley residents and the Greeks seek to exclude large
segments of the population from their respective communities, the Greeks’ method of
exclusion raises different considerations. The Panther Valley criterion for exclusion is
relatively objective and transparent. (Type III sex offenders are excluded and anyone else
who can afford to purchase a home may do so.) The Greeks’ criteria for admission, by
contrast, hinges on relatively subjective factors like affability and fashion sense,44 and the
members of the community may be reluctant to reveal fully the bases for admission,
perhaps out of fear that those seeking admission will misrepresent themselves as a means
of obtaining an invitation to join.45 This distinction has important consequences for both
the existing members of a community and those who seek entry.46
Applying an objective, readily observable admissions criteria requires few
resources. Thus, the residents of Panther Valley need not gather very much information
in order to determine whether a would-be owner or occupant will be admitted. By
contrast, the members of fraternities and sororities must devote substantial energy to
collecting, verifying, synthesizing, and evaluating information about would-be applicants.
Not surprisingly, fraternity members apply various heuristics to help them with these
complex analyses. Levine and Sussman’s sociological account of fraternity rush quotes
members who use these heuristics:
You can tell right away by their faces or the way they shake hands.
A cold, clammy handshake versus a warm, friendly one. Or by the way
they are dressed.
You can see right through them in five minutes.
First, I’m concerned with how they are dressed. It’s not a matter of
Ivy League clothes, but looking neat and well-groomed. The next thing is
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The rush process at fraternities and sororities has been studied from both sociological and economic
perspectives. For interesting accounts, see Monica Biernat et al., Selective Self-Stereotyping, 71 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1194 (1996); Gene Norman Levine & Leila A. Sussman, Social Class and
Sociability in Fraternity Pledging, 65 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 391 (1960); Susan Mongell & Alvin E. Roth,
Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 441 (1991); Guillermo de los
Reyes & Paul Rich, Housing Students: Fraternities and Residential Colleges, 585 ANNALS AM. ACADEMY
POL. & SOC. SCI. 118 (2003).
44
Levine & Sussman, supra note 43, at 395-96.
45
Cf. Mongell & Roth, supra note 43, at 460 (finding strategic behavior by pledges seeking admission
to sororities).
46
Another potential advantage of vague criteria and bouncer’s discretion is that it makes it more
difficult to prevail in a lawsuit against the bouncer for improper exclusion. Some scholars have advocated
legal rules requiring the articulation of justifications for why particular people were excluded from
property. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty after Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV.
305, 308-09 (1994). The problem with this approach is that articulation of a justification invites costly
second guessing and legal intervention. Giving the bouncer the right to exclude unreasonably hardly
guarantees that he will behave unreasonably. He has his reputation at stake, after all. But it does permit the
parties to waive their rights to sue ex ante, which may maximize their joint welfare.
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a hearty handshake with a smile to go with it. A cold, clammy handshake
and a tense face don’t go with me.47
Given the difficulty of evaluating the applicants exhaustively, fraternity members opt for
time-saving methodologies like snap judgments, visual cues, and the evidently popular
handshake heuristic. To the extent that the individual members apply different criteria or
obfuscate about the criteria, the fraternity members must devote resources to aggregating
preferences or reconciling conflicting criteria. The difference, in short, between Panther
Valley and Pi Veta, is the absence of an information asymmetry in the former and the
presence of such an asymmetry in the latter. Fraternity members have a much harder time
discovering the attributes of applicants and perhaps care about more of these attributes
because their members will live in closer proximity, so they keep their admissions criteria
a secret. Panther Valley, thanks to Megan’s Law, can determine who is a sex offender at
a low cost, so they publicize their criteria in unambiguous terms.
The choice of objective or subjective bases for admission have consequences for
the applicants as well. Given the clarity of Panther Valley’s restrictions on entry, it is
unlikely that many ineligible residents will attempt to join the community. Real estate
agents will presumably inform would-be buyers who they suspect of having shady pasts
about the restrictions before they even look at any properties in Panther Valley. The
Greeks’ more subjective entry requirements may do a poorer job of dissuading those
whose chances of admission are remote from applying. As a result, the Greeks’
exclusionary tactics may raise applicant expectations in a manner that ultimately creates
great disappointment for those who are not admitted to their fraternity or sorority of
choice. To avoid this problem, the Greeks try to send hints to applicants who seek
admission but are unlikely to gain entry that they should look elsewhere.48
None of this is to say that governance is absent in a campus fraternity. To the
contrary, governance functions as an important supplement to fine-grained exclusion.49
But it appears that in many fraternities and sororities bouncer’s exclusion is instrumental
in promoting a particular community character, and the exclusion of potential misfits
makes fraternity governance far more efficient than it otherwise would be.
3.

Intellectual Property Rights

Influential property scholarship by Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg has
sounded the alarm about the possibility that an anticommons in intellectual property
might prevent the development of valuable medical therapies.50 They hypothesize that in
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology research sectors a tragedy of the anticommons
might arise, in which any of a plethora of resource owners can block important research
from going forward, but no individual has the authority to green light research over the
objections of multiple patent holders.51 Their discussion of the possibility of a tragedy of
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Levine & Sussman, supra note 43, at 396.
Id.
49
See, e.g., Recognition and Governance of Undergraduate Social Fraternities and Sororities, available
in <http://www.vpul.upenn.edu/osl/recognition_policy.pdf> (visited Sep. 26, 2005).
50
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
51
Id.
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the anticommons constitutes an important contribution to property theory, but the
evidence that an anticommons actually exists in the biomedical realm has been scant.52
If a tragedy of the anticommons has failed to materialize, what explains this? It
appears likely that the explanation stems from bouncer’s right behavior by holders of the
relevant patents, as opposed to hermit’s right behavior. Intellectual property scholars
have determined that major pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms are acquiring large
patent portfolios as a means of trading with their competitor firms, engaging in
transactions that permit both firms to engage in profitable lines of research.53 To be sure,
these portfolios might be used to exclude new entrants in the biomedical industries, and
in that sense a tragedy might arise. But, to date, the evidence appears to suggest that
selective licensing through patent portfolios is helping firms in the industry avert a
serious tragedy of the anticommons.
D.

Exclusionary Vibes

When I was an undergraduate at a large, state-subsidized university, I got the
sense that there was a fair bit of homogeneity within each of the many fraternity and
sorority houses on campus,54 and attributed this homogeneity to the rush and pledge
processes. But then I moved into cooperative student housing and noticed a similar level
of homogeneity within particular houses, which was initially puzzling, since any student
could move into a campus cooperative.55 The co-ops did not exercise the bouncer’s right
at all (except to exclude nonstudent residents), and yet each house seemed to have a
distinct personality, not unlike the fraternities and sororities that I occasionally visited.
Governance and socialization seemed like incomplete explanations for this
homogeneity.56 If my impressions were correct, this homogeneity in the campus
52

Richard A Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 153, 166-68 (F. Scott Kieff ed. 2003); David S. Evans &
Anne Layne-Farrar, Software Patents and Open Source: The Battler over Intellectual Property Rights, 9
VA. L. & TECH. 10, 56-59 (2004); see also Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the
Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 1004-09 (2005) (finding no evidence of an anticommons in the
computer software industry).
53
John H. Barton, Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 851, 853-56 (2002); Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Crawford, American Patent Policy,
Biotechnology, and African Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 351-52
(2004).
54
For more on homogeneity within the Greek system, see Ernest T. Pascarella et al., Influences on
Students’ Openness to Diversity and Challenge in the First Year of College, 67 J. HIGHER ED. 174, 190
(1996).
55
That is not to say that the Greek system in general and the cooperative system in general attracted
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were at least somewhat grounded in reality: Cooperative residents as a group appeared to be more liberal
and less well-off, more likely to dress like slackers, more politically correct, and less interested in the
university’s athletic teams. For an interesting exploration of the perceived validity of stereotypes
surrounding fraternity and sorority membership, see Biernat et al., supra note 43, at 1994.
56
Nor is it the case that the coops were homogenous because coop members were the “leftovers” of the
Greeks’ selection process. Approximately 2500 students presently live in Berkeley’s fraternities and
sororities, and the campus cooperative have approximately 1300 members. See Patrick Hoge et al., Cal
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at <http://www.usca.org/about/uscahistory.php> (visited Sep. 30, 2005). The vast majority of Berkeley’s
20,000 undergraduates sought housing in neither the Greek system nor the cooperatives.

14

cooperatives raised interesting questions about what was substituting for the bouncer’s
right.
Given the costliness of governance mechanisms, there is great demand for various
forms of fine-grained exclusion that can make governance more efficient or eliminate the
need for formal governance altogether. But there are costs that arise whenever a resource
owner wishes to use the bouncer approach. For example, the bouncer must be trained and
paid. The bouncer may make mistakes and admit too many of the wrong people or two
few of the right people. Excluded third parties may engage in violent self help if they
believe the resource owner has no legal right to exclude them. And people seeking entry
may misrepresent themselves as a way of fooling the bouncer into letting them enter a
space to which they should not be admitted. Where a resource owner finds both
governance and bouncer’s exclusion cost prohibitive, he will often employ the
“exclusionary vibes” strategy.
An exclusionary vibes approach involves the landowner’s communication to
potential entrants about the character of the community’s inhabitants. Such
communication tells potential entrants that certain people may not feel welcome if they
enter the community in question, because they will not share certain affinities with
existing or future residents. Although the landowner invokes no legal right to exclude
anyone from the property in question, an exclusionary vibe may still be effective at
excluding a targeted population thanks to two mechanisms. First, a third party may view
the exclusionary vibe as an effective tool for creating a focal point around which people
can organize their affairs.57 A variation on this focal points effect arises if the third party
assumes that the exclusionary vibe will create a community population that is likely to
embrace bouncer’s exclusion at a later date as a means of removing him from the
community.58 Second, the third party may assume, incorrectly, that the exclusionary vibe
is backed by a bouncer’s right to exclude third parties who are not made to feel welcome
by the exclusionary vibe.59 I will elaborate on both of these mechanisms in detail, using a
hypothetical community.
Suppose that a condo developer sees a market niche for residential communities
targeted toward extroverted individuals. To that end, the developer advertises his new
condominium as “Social Butterfly Place.” This advertising should suffice to make the
condominium attractive to social butterflies and their families, and unattractive to more
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There is an extensive literature on the use of “cheap talk” (i.e., low-cost communication) to establish
focal points in coordination games. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell, Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry, 18
RAND J. OF ECON. 34, 39 (1987); Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, 10 J. OF ECON.
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REV. 1115, 1141-44 (1996) (discussing the propensity for local government boundaries to facilitate a
citizen’s selection of a community containing a solid majority of voters whose values mirror his own).
59
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introverted individuals, even if the developer does not invest in any amenities that are
designed to appeal to the extroverted.
How come? Here we see the dynamics working together. Extroverted individuals
probably will value proximity to fellow extroverts, so that they can easily find outgoing
partners for conversation and joint social activities. Introverts may feel left out or
marginalized living in the building, and this marginalization may impose real social and
psychological costs on them. Because they may anticipate incurring some of these costs if
they move in to Social Butterfly Place, many introverts will opt for a residence in some
other building, ceteris paribus. This phenomenon illustrates the possibility for
exclusionary vibes to serve as focal points.
Savvier introverted prospective condominium purchasers may be deterred from
moving into Social Butterfly Place as well. These third parties would understand that the
developer could do nothing to stop them from purchasing a home in the building, but
would recognize the effectiveness of the focal point strategy at establishing a
homogeneous population of residents consisting largely of extroverts. Even if one of
these introverts did not care whether he felt left out of his neighbor’s social interactions,
he would rightly worry about the prospects that his extroverted neighbors might in the
future: a) decide to use the bouncer’s right to expel introverts if they concluded that there
were too many introverts in their midst; or b) adopt, by majority vote, governance rules
that made life pleasant for extroverts and unpleasant for introverts, such as mandatory
weekly condominium association meetings, or lax nighttime noise regulations for
hallway conversations and parties within units.
Finally, some would-be condominium purchasers will see the sign “Social
Butterfly Place” and erroneously assume that only extroverts are permitted to reside
there. In other words, they may misread the exclusionary vibe as indicative of a
developer’s intent and authority to exercise a trespass-based right to exclude them. If they
were to ask the developer whether introverts may reside in the tower, the developer
would say that all are welcome, but many people are embarrassed to ask questions of that
sort or ignorant of their legal rights. Hence an exclusionary vibe may act as an effective
bluff that prevents some third parties who are targeted for exclusion from moving into a
community. At some level, then, a fence and a “Beware of Dog” sign are fungible, even
if there is no dog.
As these examples indicate, the simple act of naming a new development “Social
Butterfly Place” could prove effective at excluding the introverted from residence in the
development. Exclusionary vibes thus can function as a substitute for, or a complement
to, the bouncer’s right. Thus, what might superficially appear to be a developer’s First
Amendment commercial speech right actually takes on much greater significance as a
property right, and it is appropriate to characterize the exclusionary vibe as a right to
exclude. It should be equally clear that every exclusionary message is implicitly
inclusionary with respect to those people who would prefer to live in a community that is
devoid of those people who are targeted for exclusion.
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In the real world, real estate developers sometimes do market their residences as
paradise for extroverts.60 The exclusionary vibes strategy is quite prevalent where other
groups or attributes are targeted for exclusion or inclusion as well. Condominium
buildings adopt names like Cotton Hope Plantation61 and Sholom House.62 And
individual cooperative houses near my old university campus described the character of
their communities in great detail on the Internet.63 We need not strain our minds too
much in order to see the power of exclusionary vibes. Imagine, for example, the sales
center for a mixed-income planned development in a large Southern city. The sales center
looks identical to any other sales center, with one difference: A large confederate battle
flag flies on the flagpole out front. The mere presence of this flag would produce a first
generation of homeowners who are overwhelmingly white.64 What follows is a brief
survey of the legal regulation of exclusionary vibes.
1.

The Regulation of Residential Advertising

Before breaking ground on a new residential community, a real estate developer
will spend a great deal of time thinking about the types of residents he would like to
attract, given prevailing market conditions and the nature of the property in question.
Once he has made that determination, the developer will create a marketing strategy
designed to attract those types of people and, simultaneously, convince those types of
people who he does not want to attract to take their housing dollars elsewhere.
Today’s media outlets enable a great deal of message tailoring, with particular
messages intended to reach particular recipients. Real estate developers market directly to
consumers, mostly through print and Internet-based advertisements, but occasionally via
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available
in
<http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/realestate/stories.nsf/buildingahome/story/045852EAA8E1C16D86257
0570051A33C?OpenDocument> (visited Aug. 26, 2005).
61
See Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime, 508 S.E.2d 565 (S.C. 1998).
62
Aquarian Found. v. Sholom House, Inc., 448 So.2d 1166 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984).
63
The cooperatives have several “theme houses,” such as the vegetarian theme house, the African
American theme house, and the Gay-Lesbian-Bisexual theme house. See The Coops, available in
<http://www.usca.org/understand/thecoops/> (visited Sep. 30, 2005). Any student may live in these
buildings, but the theme certainly affects the applicant pool. Other houses without themes nevertheless
presented differentiated personalities on the Internet. Compare Ridge House, (“On the spectrum of studious
to social, Ridge House would be on the more studious end. (For example, the study room gets the best
afternoon light and you can probably find someone studying in there at any given hour.) We don’t host any
huge co-op notable parties . . . and you know what?--at Ridge, we’re all pretty fine with that. . . . Pretty
much we’re all kind of normal-looking, with a pretty even spread of majors, and arsty/sportsy/nerdy
interests.”), available in < http://www.usca.org/understand/thecoops/rid.php>; with Andres Castro Arms,
(“We will forever host the BEST co-op party ever! … The Infamous Disco Party. We will always road trip
the hardest; from Tahoe to Joshua Tree – snowboarding to rock climbing – we do it all. . . . Overstuffed
sofas so soft that you can melt into them. A game room stocked with Double Dragon, foosball, and a pool
table. All the Oreos and Nutella you can eat. And of course…a hot tub for those cold winter nights.
Yes…Castro has more luxury features than a Coupe DeVille. If it ain’t high livin’, we ain’t havin’ it.”),
available in < http://www.usca.org/understand/thecoops/aca.php>.
64
I thank Adam Samaha for suggesting this salient example. For further discussion of the propensity
for the battle flag to polarize the races and send hostile signals to African Americans, see Daniels v.
Harrison County Bd. of Supervisors, 722 So.2d 136, 139 (Miss. 1998) (Banks, J., concurring in result).

17

television or radio.65 Developers also market to consumers through real estate agents, and
the means of communicating with agents are quite varied. A developers’ choice of
advertising media may have substantial effects in skewing the audience of potential
buyers who hear about a development. The choice to advertise locally, regionally, or
nationally may skew the audience. The choice to advertise in mostly English-language
publications or non-English publications will make a big difference, as will the choice of
program for radio or television advertisements. All these various strategies for marketing
are reasonably well understood, and regulated to varying degrees.66
Advertising can communicate exclusionary vibes through more subtle means, as
well. For example, print advertisements or billboards may make use of models enjoying
their idyllic residential surroundings. Advertisements or billboards depicting exclusively
Caucasian models will tend to attract Caucasians, whereas those depicting exclusively (or
largely) African American models will attract African Americans.67 Even more subtly,
developers may use particular color schemes or themes in advertising, sales centers, or
model homes, to “signal” consumers about the characteristics of people they would like
to attract.68 Advertising, in short, can be an effective means for attracting certain types of
consumers and dissuading other types of consumers from purchasing in a new
development.
In some instances, seemingly innocuous actions steeped in history convey a
powerful message to white and black audiences alike. For most of the twentieth century,
a siren atop Villa Grove, Illinois’s water tower rang out at six o’clock every evening.69
The siren’s purpose was to provide a warning to African Americans that they were
required to leave Villa Grove for the night if they had not already done so.70 When
sociologist James Loewen visited Villa Grove to investigate, all twelve of the town’s
residents that he interviewed independently confirmed the significance of the siren’s
sounding.71 Remarkably, the town continued to sound the siren every evening until 1999,
when the practice stopped. Loewen writes, “I had hoped it stopped the practice because
residents became ashamed of why it was first put in place, no longer cared to explain its
origin to their children or guests, and had reconsidered their sundown policy. No, I
65
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learned, it stopped owing to complaints about the noise from residents living near the
water tower.”72 In the most recent census, Villa Grove counted just eight African
Americans among its 2,553 residents.73 The nearby community of Champaign, by
contrast, is 15.6% African American.74
2.

Aesthetics

After a developer has sold off the lots in a new development, there will no longer
be any reason for him to maintain an advertising presence with respect to the new
development. This vacuum presents a potential problem for residents who expect to live
in the development for a long time and hope that a neighborhood’s character will be
maintained beyond the first generation of buyers. What can a developer do to give these
residents, who expect to live in the community for the long-haul, some piece of mind?
Obviously, to some extent, a highly effective exclusionary advertising campaign
can have second-generation and third-generation consequences. Upon searching for
housing, second-generation buyers may attempt to discern some information about the
composition of the existing community, and, if there is a real shortage of people with
whom they feel affinity, they may elect to purchase elsewhere.75 But predicting these
second-generation decisions is going to be made more difficult by the law’s restrictions
on the types of information that second generation buyers can obtain about their
neighbors. Real estate agents can get into serious trouble if they answer questions about a
neighborhood’s racial or religious composition, for example, and alternative sources of
information – such as census data or repeated strolls around the neighborhood – may be
imprecise.76 Moreover, although coordinated purchasing by minority groups is rare, it can
happen, and there are historical examples of such purchases snowballing into rapid
neighborhood transformation.77
In such circumstances, developers and first generation residents may seek more
permanent exclusionary devices. For example, a developer may arrange for the
construction of homes in his development that exclusively adopt particular architectural
styles. Different architectural styles will appeal to divergent groups of people. A
subdivision of Tudor style homes may attract stodgy families, whereas a subdivision
72
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constructed exclusively of homes in the California modern style may attract edgier first
and second generation residents. Given the expense of transitioning from one type of
architectural style to another, these first generation decisions might lock into place
particular homeowner homogeneities for many generations.78
3.

“No Trespassing Signs” and Public Trust Lands

In California and other states that recognize a robust public trust doctrine,
members of the general public have statutory, common law, or even constitutional rights
to access those portions of the beach that fall below the high tide line.79 In many cases,
these rights are supplemented by dry sand access rights that state or local governments
have negotiated on the public’s behalf as a condition of granting a private homeowner a
building permit. Notwithstanding these public easements, lots with unspoiled beachfront
views remain tremendously desirable for California homeowners. Many of these
homeowners have done their best to create the misimpression that the wet sand behind
their homes is unencumbered.80 To that end they have posted “no trespassing signs” on
the beach.81 Even though members of the public would not have been trespassing had
they ignored the signs, the signs served their purpose, preventing many members of the
public from using the wet sand portions of the beach behind privately owned homes.82 As
a result, the California Coastal Commission has had to fight back, issuing violation
notices against these owners and mandating the removal of these signs.83 That the
Commission felt compelled to act in these circumstances underscores the point of this
discussion, which is that exclusionary vibes can be quite effective exclusionary devices,
even where those vibes merely amount to bluffing by the owner.84
4.

The Inadequacies of Exclusionary Vibes

Exclusionary vibes may diminish the magnitude of these difficulties, but raise a
host of new difficulties. For example, exclusionary vibes may be ineffective if too many
people who the landowner would prefer to exclude are oblivious to the signal or have
contrarian instincts. Alternatively, exclusionary vibes may be too controversial if they are
noticed and denounced by third parties who object to the content of the exclusionary
78
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message, asserting that such a message implies second-class citizenship for the part of the
community that is targeted for exclusion.85 In such instances, a landowner may seek an
exclusion strategy that is both more effective and less in-your-face than an exclusionary
vibe. Exclusionary amenity strategies present an attractive alternative.
E.

Exclusionary Amenities

An exclusionary amenity is a common amenity that is embedded in a residential
community at least in part because willingness to pay for the amenity functions as a
proxy for some desired characteristic.86 An exclusionary amenity is a collective resource
that provokes a polarizing response among people who are considering purchasing a
home or renting an apartment in a particular community. Prospective purchasers (or
renters) who the developer (or landlord) would like to attract will regard the community
as more attractive because of the presence of the amenity, and prospective purchasers
who the developer would not like to attract will regard the community as less attractive
because of the amenity’s presence. In another paper, I hypothesized that during the 1990s
golf courses in residential developments functioned as exclusionary amenities because
golf participation was a better proxy for race than wealth, income, or virtually any other
characteristic. The paper provided circumstantial evidence to indicate that by purchasing
homes in mandatory membership golf communities, some nongolfing homeowners were
essentially purchasing Caucasian residential homogeneity.87 The punch line of that paper
was that the exclusionary amenities strategy might permit developers to circumvent laws
that prohibit race discrimination in sales (the bouncer’s right) and advertising
(exclusionary vibes).
The residential golf course is not the only possible manifestation of the
exclusionary amenities strategy. On the contrary, real estate developers seeking to create
a “Catholic Gated Community” have noticed how placing a new Catholic school – Ave
Maria University – at the center of their planned residential community can help promote
the overwhelmingly Catholic character of their new development.88 Virginia real estate
developers interested in minimizing the number of families with school-aged children in
their condominium building invested heavily in an attractive bar and billiards room, but
consciously avoided putting a playroom anywhere in the structure.89 And, by the same
token, many communities forego investing in public transportation hubs or basketball
courts that their residents would very much like to use, because of a fear that such
inclusionary amenities might attract the wrong kinds of people to the community.90
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It is an expensive proposition, of course, to construct a golf course or religious
university at the center of a residential development. So why would someone seeking to
achieve residential homogeneity go to all that trouble? Precisely because an exclusionary
amenities strategy may prove more effective than exclusionary vibes alone. After all, an
exclusionary amenity may be as successful in establishing a focal point as an
exclusionary vibe, allowing people with similar preferences or attributes to find each
other and live as neighbors. And the exclusionary amenity will provide added punch: a
tax that falls most heavily on people who lack those similar preferences or attributes. So,
let us assume that the Ave Maria Township residents subsidize the adjacent university by
picking up the costs of its police protection, utilities, and land acquisition costs. As a
result, homeowners in Ave Maria Township will face higher monthly assessments than
homeowners in a neighboring homeowners association that is not affiliated with an
institution of higher learning. A devout, traditionalist Catholic homeowner might be
happy to pay this extra assessment, perhaps because he plans to make use of the
theological books in the university’s library and values proximity to it, or because he
wants to live near the sorts of neighbors who would value proximity to such a library. But
a non-Catholic Ave Maria homeowner who did not particularly want to live in an
overwhelmingly Catholic neighborhood would get nothing of value in exchange for his
higher monthly assessment: He would not use the library himself, and would not
particularly care about whether his neighbors used the library or not. If there are
otherwise similar neighborhoods surrounding Ave Maria, we should expect to see Ave
Maria Township take on an overwhelmingly Catholic character and other neighborhoods
take on a relatively non-Catholic character. The result will be religious residential
segregation, achieved with no overt discrimination and an advertising campaign that need
not include blatant exclusionary vibes. The differential tax on non-Catholic homeowners
in Ave Maria will serve the same focal points purpose as the exclusionary vibe, and will
further exclude third parties who might have been impervious to, or oblivious of,
exclusionary vibes. Furthermore, unlike a one-time advertising campaign, the presence of
the university will directly affect the purchasing decisions of several generations of
owners.
F.

Nontrespass-Based Rights as Property Rights

My suggestion that there is a distinction between the hermit’s right and the
bouncer’s right will no doubt prove relatively uncontroversial. A few property scholars
may bristle, however, at my suggestion that nontrespass-based rights, such as
exclusionary vibes and exclusionary amenities, also belong in the category of “property
rights.” This skepticism warrants a brief treatment of the subject.
As an initial matter, I want to undermine the traditionalist conception that only “in
rem” rights are the subject of “Property.” This paper has pointed out the enormous
economic importance associated with the right to emit exclusionary vibes, and the trivial
economic role of the hermit’s right. If an owner is deprived of the former, he will often
lose his shirt, but if deprived of the latter, he will most likely shrug and continue going
about his business. The right to emit exclusionary vibes and, to a lesser extent, the right
to embed exclusionary amenities, is a large part of what it means to own a resource.
What’s more, the nontrespass based exclusion rights are functional substitutes for the
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pure in-rem exclusion rights that are enforced via trespass law. That makes the
nontrespass-based rights, in my view, genuine property rights.
A critic of my view would point out that one can communicate exclusionary vibes
with respect to a resource without owning that resource. This criticism is correct, but
largely beside the point. Exclusionary or inclusionary messages will be taken most
seriously by third parties in those instances where it is the resource owner herself who is
conveying the message. After all, the owner of the resource typically has the greatest
incentive to engage in speech concerning his resource and the most information about
who is likely to be joining the community in question. For this reason, an owner of a
resource almost always will be more successful than a third party at establishing a focal
point around which potential users of that resource can organize themselves. Third parties
understand this, and will weigh the owners’ speech most heavily as a consequence.
Communicative exclusion, then, does not require a res, but the exclusionary message is
most persuasive when articulated by the res’s owner. I think that pragmatic point should
end the discussion, but readers interested in further thoughts on the place of nontrespassbased rights in an in-rem / in-personam framework can chew on these three paragraphs of
footnote text.91
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G.

Exclusionary Strategies as Substitutes in Property Theory and Caselaw

As a general matter, discussions of the “right to exclude” in property theory refer
to a unified right, as opposed to a fragmented one. Courts typically do the same thing.
And yet this linguistic convention is undercut by a common analytical move made by
some courts and scholars, which is to minimize the scope of laws that infringe on the
right to exclude by invoking the logic of fragmentation. In so doing, these courts and
scholars have implicitly recognized a principle that I have made explicit: The various
rights to exclude are substitutes for one another. At the same time, their analysis often
obscures an important caveat, which is that these rights are not perfect substitutes.
1.

Takings

The fragmentation of the right to exclude takes on real importance in takings
cases. Takings doctrine places substantial weight on the distinction between partial
deprivations of property interests and complete deprivations of property interests.92
Drawing the line here is highly problematic, given that so much of black letter property
law deals with the various ways in which interests in land can be divided. Hence, those of
us who are interested in takings law must endure the spectacle of Supreme Court justices
sniping at one another over the unanswerable question of whether a temporary
moratorium on the development of land is a total taking of a term-of-years leasehold
interest, for which the Constitution compels compensation, or a partial taking of a fee
simple interest, in which case compensation is not mandated by the case law.93 It
therefore should not be surprising to see the same debates play out in controversies where
the plaintiff alleges that a government regulation has completely deprived him of his right
to exclude. In recent years, the federal courts seem to have moved toward fragmentation
of the right to exclude, though perhaps unwittingly. A comparison of the Supreme
Court’s takings opinions from the 1980s and lower appellate court opinions from the
1990s is particularly revealing.
The plaintiff in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, a shopping center owner,
alleged that a state constitutional provision mandating that he provide reasonable access
to political pamphleteers constituted a regulatory taking of his right to exclude.94 The
state provision was a classic interference with the bouncer’s right.95 Still thinking in
unitary terms, the Court characterized the provision as a taking of the right to exclude
itself.96 Yet the Court concluded that the state constitutional provision did not amount to
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a taking of the plaintiff’s property for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment because the
plaintiff “failed to demonstrate that the ‘right to exclude others’ is so essential to the use
or economic value of their property that the state-authorized limitation of it amounted to a
‘taking.’”97 Thus, said the Court, a loss of the right to exclude was not decisive in takings
law. What mattered was the extent to which the government regulation adversely affected
the plaintiff’s economic interests.
Just two years later, however, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corporation,98 the Supreme Court suggested that a permanent deprivation of the right to
exclude would amount to a per se taking, even if the economic impact of the deprivation
was de minimis.99 Loretto seemed to elevate the importance of the right to exclude in
takings doctrine. Inevitably, commentators trying to make sense of the Supreme Court’s
about-face seized on the idea of fragmenting the right to exclude:
At first glance, Pruneyard might appear to undermine the right to exclude
others so explicitly protected by . . . Loretto. However, Pruneyard is
clearly distinguishable from [Loretto] on the following grounds: 1) The
property owner in Pruneyard was already inviting the general public onto
his premises but sought to exclude only those with whose speech he
disagreed.100
This analysis is satisfying in one respect and flawed in another. It is satisfying in the
sense that it implicitly recognizes what the Pruneyard and Loretto Courts missed, which
is that there are several different types of exclusion, and depriving an owner of one right
to exclude does not deprive the owner of all rights to exclude. But the analysis is
disappointing in the sense that it seems to suggest there is an important difference
between the deprivation of both the hermit’s right and the bouncer’s right in Loretto and
a mere deprivation of a bouncer’s right in Pruneyard.101 The notion that this distinction
makes a difference rests on the untenable idea that the hermit’s right is somehow valuable
to the owner of a for-profit shopping center.102 In short, scholarly efforts to reconcile
Pruneyard and Loretto have moved us toward the important idea that the various rights to
97
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exclude are substitutes for each other, but obscured the fact that they are imperfect
substitutes, such that the deprivation of one right to exclude in a particular context can be
devastating for its owner. Work by other distinguished scholars has fallen into the same
trap.103
Lower federal court opinions after Loretto have continued making a mess of
things, issuing inconsistent pronouncements about what it means to be deprived of the
right to exclude. The Eleventh Circuit, in particular, has been all over the map. In Cable
Holdings of Georgia v. McNeal Real Estate Fund VI, the court held that a federal law
mandating that cable companies receive access to private property via rights-of-way that
had already been obtained by other utilities would likely deprive a property owner of his
right to exclude and therefore amount to a taking for which compensation was owed.104
Hence the court adopted a saving construction of the federal statute to avoid this
constitutional difficulty.105 Note that the federal law at issue in Cable Holdings would
have, at most, deprived a property owner of the right to exclude a few parties for a
particular purpose, thus amounting to a partial deprivation of the bouncer’s right. But the
court equated this partial deprivation of the bouncer’s right with a total deprivation of the
unitary right to exclude.
Four years later, in New Port Largo v. Monroe County, the same court was faced
with a much more severe restriction on a property owner’s bouncer’s right.106 The
landowner, New Port Largo, purchased a large parcel shortly before the land was rezoned
from residential use to private airport use. New Port Largo argued that this zoning change
completely deprived it of discretion to admit residential owners to the property, zoning
“private property so it could only be used for the public good” as an airport. Without
citing Cable Holdings, the court rejected New Port Largo’s claim that the rezone
constituted “a deprivation of the right to exclude.”
The County’s act of rezoning the property to private airport was not, in
itself, a deprivation of the right to exclude. NPL nowhere contends that, as
a matter of law, the rezoning to private airport required it to admit the
public. Because the property could have remained dormant, consistent
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with the PA zoning, NPL cannot argue that the rezoning was a deprivation
of the right to exclude in the traditional sense.107
To restate the court’s conclusion, there was no taking because even though the
infringement on the bouncer’s right was very substantial, New Port Lago retained the
(worthless) hermit’s right.
I do not cite to these conflicting pronouncements about the right to exclude from
the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit because I am interested in taking a position
here about the rightness of Pruneyard and New Port Lago and the wrongness of Loretto
and Cable Holdings, or vice versa. Indeed, I believe it is a fool’s errand to try to decide
whether a taking has occurred on the basis of whether there has been a deprivation of the
right to exclude, or two rights to exclude, or one-half of a right to exclude. Rather, my
purpose in citing the case law and the scholarship about the right to exclude in the takings
context is two-fold. First, I want to show that while several courts and commentators
have implicitly and conveniently embraced efforts to fragment the right to exclude, they
have done so in a haphazard way. Hence, there is a genuine need for the kind of
conceptual clarity that can come from systematic fragmentation and reconstruction of the
right to exclude. Second, those courts and commentators that have taken baby steps
toward the fragmentation project, often in service of favored outcomes, have paid
insufficient attention to the extent to which the various rights to exclude are imperfect
substitutes for one another.
This discussion of takings law suggests that although courts recognize that the
hermit’s right and bouncer’s right may be disaggregated, courts have not given any
consideration to the relationship between these rights and the exclusionary vibe or the
exclusionary amenity. As we turn to the law of adverse possession and the Fair Housing
Act, however, we begin to see property doctrine recognizing the distinction between
trespass-based exclusion rights, like the hermit’s right and the bouncer’s right, and
nontrespass-based exclusion rights, like exclusionary vibes and exclusionary amenities.
2.

Adverse Possession

Adverse possession is one of the older doctrines in Anglo-American property law,
tracing its origins to thirteenth-century English law.108 American rules requiring that an
adverse possessor occupy the land in an “open and notorious” and “exclusive” manner
are of ancient vintage by American standards, dating to the early nineteenth century.109
The “open and notorious” element requires that the trespasser seeking to establish
ownership by adverse possession must have communicated his exclusive ownership to
the community, such that neighbors or passersby would have assumed, incorrectly, that
the trespasser was in fact the owner of the land.110 Thus, one element of adverse
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possession requires that the trespasser demonstrate the kind of exclusionary vibe “bluff”
that I discussed previously.111
Quite apart from the “open and notorious” element, the law also requires the
trespasser to demonstrate exclusivity, which means that neither the true owner nor any
other trespasser physically possessed the property during the statute of limitations
period.112 Now the law is referencing, not the trespasser’s success at communicating
exclusionary messages, but rather his success in physically excluding all outsiders who
lack the trespasser’s permission to be on the land. By disaggregating these aspects of
exclusion into two separate elements for the purposes of adverse possession claims, the
law has long recognized that one form of exclusion is an imperfect substitute for the
other, and that only when both are present has a trespasser effectively exercised the right
to exclude, such that the law should recognize his newly respectable status as a
landowner.113
Previous property scholarship on exclusion has focused on trespass law. In the
law of trespass, communicative exclusion is legally irrelevant. But this brief exploration
of adverse possession law demonstrates that communicative exclusion, quite apart from a
legal right to exclude founded on trespass law, has long been important in the American
law. Hence, the point I have made herein, about the interconnectedness of trespass-based
exclusion rights and communication-based exclusion rights, really has been lurking
within the structure of property law for centuries.
Indeed, the presence of adverse possession law itself in American law underscores
a presumption about the effectiveness of communicative exclusion. Remember that an
adverse possessor is, in essence, a trespasser who manages, for several years to convince
those around him of his exclusive legal right to occupy land and exclude all others from
it, even though he in fact has no such right. The success of adverse possession claims,
then, is a testament to the power of the communicative bluff, even when something quite
valuable is at stake.
111

See supra section I.D.
Striefel, 733 A.2d at 993; Vela v. Hester, 280 S.W.2d 389, 371 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
113
Why require both? It seems plain that communicative exclusion without effective exclusion (i.e.,
satisfying adverse possession’s “open and notorious” prong, but not its “exclusivity” prong) should be
insufficient to transform a trespasser into a landowner. After all, if the trespasser cannot show exclusive
possession of the land during the statute of limitations period, this suggests that the communicative
message was not particularly effective, and there is no reason to reward trespassers whose exclusionary
messages are ignored by the relevant third parties. But why is the exclusionary message mandated? Why
isn’t evidence of successful exclusion sufficient? In the adverse possession context, the answer appears to
be that exclusive possession provides insufficient notice to the owner of a resource that he might be losing
something of value. Hence, the law dictates that the obvious adverse possessor may win, but the subtle
adverse possessor should lose. See Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258, 263-264 (N.J. 1969). The law’s
approach here is based on the understandable intuition that a prior landowner need not be expected to be
particularly vigilant in order to maintain ownership of land that he has lawfully obtained. This insight
perhaps has application beyond adverse possession law. Cf. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
663, 686-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that if the Boy Scouts want to invoke an associational
freedom exception to state antidiscrimination laws, they should at least be required to advertise their
exclusionary policies broadly). Justice Stevens might have noted that an additional benefit of requiring an
organization to proclaim its discriminatory policies publicly in order to benefit from the First Amendment’s
defense against antidiscrimination laws is that such a requirement would alert potential opponents and
provide fair warning to the homosexuals who cannot be scouts under the organization’s policies.
112

28

3.

Fair Housing Act

Case law interpreting the federal Fair Housing Act also has recognized
communicative exclusion as a form of behavior that should be regulated, regardless of
whether that communication is successful in achieving residential segregation. The
Fourth Circuit has held that in enacting the Fair Housing Act, Congress prohibited
racially discriminatory advertisements for rental housing, even by those landlords who
were free, under the “Mrs. Murphy” exception for owner-occupied buildings containing
four units or less, to refuse to rent their apartments on the basis of race or other suspect
criteria.114 (Mrs. Murphy was the hypothetical “mom and pop” landlord who rented out a
few extra bedrooms in her home to supplement her income.)115 To rationalize this
counterintuitive result, the court noted the negative externalities that might result from
racist advertising by Mrs. Murphy landlords:
In combating racial discrimination in housing, Congress is not limited to
prohibiting only discriminatory refusals to sell or rent. Widespread
appearance of discriminatory advertisements in public or private media
may reasonably be thought to have a harmful effect on the general aims of
the Act: seeing large numbers of ‘white only’ advertisements in one part
of a city may deter nonwhites from venturing to seek homes there, even if
other dwellings in the same area must be sold or rented on a
nondiscriminatory basis.116
Thus, held the court, there are public policy justifications that justify a congressional
policy whereby landlords are allowed to exercise the bouncer’s right, but not to
disseminate exclusionary vibes. Because of these externalities and the structure of the
FHA, a Mrs. Murphy landlord who advertises her racial preferences may be liable even if
her own unit is either racially integrated or no more segregated than it would have been in
the absence of such an advertisement.
Legal discussions of exclusionary amenity-style arguments have been almost
nonexistent. Still, there is some indication that the courts will treat exclusionary amenities
and exclusionary vibes differently under the FHA. In the only published case that
implicitly addresses a plaintiff’s exclusionary amenities style of argument, the Second
Circuit held that in order to recover under a housing discrimination-by-amenity theory, a
plaintiff asserting housing discrimination must show, not only the potential for such an
amenity to promote housing segregation, but also that the presence of an amenity actually
did produce a segregated residential environment.117 Hence, it was not enough for
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Orthodox Jewish students at Yale to show that Yale’s exclusively coeducational
dormitories forced them to choose between following their religious beliefs and paying
for a dormitory room that they would never use.118
Surveying this terrain, discriminatory exclusionary vibes alone violate the FHA,
regardless of their effectiveness in promoting segregation, but exclusionary amenities do
not. In some respects, this dichotomy is puzzling, since the Second Circuit has taken a
very hard line on exclusionary vibes under the Fair Housing Act.119 But perhaps the
court’s differentiation between the two exclusion strategies under the FHA stemmed from
a hunch that the negative externalities associated with Yale’s exclusionary amenities
were insubstantial.
In the part that follows, I will consider in a more systematic way the benefits and
costs, both private and social, associated with the various exclusion strategies. In the
course of examining why a resource owner might opt for one exclusion strategy over
another, I also will explore what the imperfect substitutability of these various
exclusionary strategies tells us about appropriate legal responses.

II.

The Resource Owner’s Choice of Exclusion Strategies

So far we have established that the four exclusion strategies can substitute for one
another, that they are imperfect substitutes, and that the law sometimes recognizes and
sometimes ignores this substitutability. Given all of that, it is worth situating ourselves in
the shoes of a resource owner so that we can evaluate the tradeoffs among the various
exclusion strategies and decide which strategy is optimal in a particular context.
At this stage it remains appropriate to focus on the three exclusion rights that really
matter. For most resource owners, the hermit’s right strategy will not be a viable
option,120 so she faces a choice among the bouncer’s right, exclusionary vibes,
exclusionary amenities, or governance. What factors drive the decision among these
options? I will discuss them below, beginning with the most important unrecognized
consideration.
A.

Private Information

The central claim in this paper is the following: Where third parties who are
potential targets for exclusion possess private information about their own attributes and
intentions, and where it is costly for a landowner to obtain or verify this information, the
landowner will be more likely to employ a nontrespass-based exclusion strategy, such as
exclusionary vibes or exclusionary amenities. Where, by contrast, those third parties who
might be excluded have no private information, the landowner will be more likely to
exercise the bouncer’s right, a trespass-based exclusion strategy.121 This central claim is
118
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based on a dynamic whereby sorting among desirable and undesirable third-party entrants
to the landowner’s property will be costly to the landowner, sometimes costly enough to
warrant delegating that sorting process to the third parties themselves.122 Analytically, the
case for exclusionary amenities or exclusionary vibes looks a lot like the law-andeconomics case for liability rules in a world of positive transaction costs.123
A few illustrations will be helpful in explaining the centrality of information costs
in a resource owner’s choice among multiple exclusionary strategies. Recall our
hypothetical real estate developer who determines that in a world of declining social
capital and increasing atomization, pent-up demand exists for a subdivision whose
residents are enormously outgoing and social.124 To make things more concrete, we will
assume that if the developer can promise potential purchasers, credibly, that enthusiastic
social entrepreneurs will be over-represented in the new development, homeowners will
be willing to pay a five percent premium for new homes. How might our developer go
about capturing that premium?
He might opt to exercise the bouncer’s right. He could, for example, interview all
people who wish to purchase homes in his new development, and only permit those
homeowners who seem particularly friendly, gregarious, and warm to purchase units.
Conducting these interviews will be time-consuming for the developer and for the
applicants. And, of course, the interviews might fail to sort potential purchasers
effectively if the developer exercises poor judgment by mistaking physically attractive or
eloquent applicants for extroverts, or is overly responsive to his idiosyncratic notions of
what makes someone a social butterfly. Because of these concerns, the developer might
ask each potential purchaser for personal references, who can then be interviewed, or
perhaps a list of social, charitable, or professional organizations with which each
potential purchaser is involved. Again, however, relying on these proxies for sociability
will be costly and imprecise. References may have incentives to be overly rosy in their
assessments, applicants may mischaracterize their involvement in civic society in ways
that are difficult for the developer to discover, and extroverted potential purchasers may
regard such a rigorous background investigation as unduly intrusive of their personal
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privacy. The problem with a bouncer’s right approach to this problem, then, is that each
potential purchaser possesses private information about his own propensity for
sociability, and it may be inordinately costly for our developer to discover this private
information.125
What if the developer opts for an exclusionary vibe instead? He might, for
example, name his development in a manner that conveys its status as a mecca for social
butterflies. He could advertise using testimonials for purchasers who talked about how
they bought homes in this particular community because the neighbors they met were so
outgoing and actively involved in community affairs. He might entice a few particularly
well-known social entrepreneurs to purchase homes in the new community and then
invest resources in publicizing these high-profile purchases.126 Now the developer can
avoid having to judge whether a particular homeowner is indeed a social butterfly.
Rather, he can rely on a focal points strategy, and assume that introverted people will be
deterred from purchasing homes in the new community by the fear of feeling left out
among their neighbors. The developer no longer needs to spend time or resources
discovering prospective purchasers’ private information because they will be making the
decision about who joins the community and who does not. In this setting, what game
theorists would dub a pure coordination game,127 self-sorting replaces developer sorting.
Of course, it may be that exclusionary vibes will not be up to the task. For
example, the developer’s ads might be too vague about the developments’ focal points, or
too many unperceptive and introverted prospective purchasers may be oblivious to the
messages. Alternatively, the payoff structure may deviate from that of a pure
coordination game in that some introverted prospective purchasers might want to buy
homes in an extroverted development, because they anticipate that they can successfully
free ride off the lower crime or higher property value appreciation that could result from
125
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their neighbors’ contact with one another. To that end, the developer may feel the need to
combine a focal points strategy with some monetary inducement that helps sort out the
introverted and extroverted: an inducement that will prevent many free riders from
moving into the community, but will not deter genuine socialites from buying a home.
For example, the developer may devote large swaths of land within the development to
playgrounds, dog runs, swimming pools, and club houses, then mandate that the costs of
creating and maintaining these social spaces be assessed against all homeowners in the
community. At the margins, these amenities may discourage the introverted from
purchasing a home within the development, because they will face the prospect of paying
hefty monthly assessments for costly amenities that they will never use. Because
willingness to pay for social amenities may function as a proxy for sociability, the
exclusionary amenities strategy seems like a promising tack for the developer to pursue.
And this strategy, like the exclusionary vibes approach, permits the developer to avoid
most of the information costs that make the bouncer’s right so inefficient in this context.
The developer merely needs to choose some basis for exclusion, and self-sorting will take
care of the rest, since third parties will have social and economic incentives to sort
themselves in accordance with the selected criteria.
In instances where private information is easily discovered by a landowner, the
costs of exercising the bouncer’s right are far lower. Recall our previous discussion of
sex offender-free subdivisions. Robust demand for sex-offender-free developments has
coincided with the widespread availability of data about sex offenders, circulated easily
as a result of the Megan’s Laws enacted by all fifty states.128 Because of these laws, an
individual’s status as a sex offender can be discovered by a residential developer at very
low cost.129 Since the value of excluding sex offenders from a residential development
appears to be high, and the costs for a developer of sorting among sex offenders and
nonsex offenders has become quite low, we should have expected to see the prevalence
of the bouncer’s right strategy here, as opposed to exclusionary vibes or exclusionary
amenities. And indeed, that is evidently the dominant strategy that real estate developers
have used.
The nonfungible and communal nature of real property renders private
information decisive in shaping owners’ strategies and makes exclusion a particularly
intriguing strategy. Compare relatively fungible resources, like automobiles or designer
clothing. In both cases, potential buyers have private information that is relevant to their
purchasing decision. In the former case, car dealers try to obtain this private information
to engage in price discrimination, and in the latter case, clothing boutiques elect not to
invest resources in trying to discover a buyer’s private willingness to pay, selling
garments at pre-set prices. So the process by which private information is extracted or
ignored by sellers is rather straightforward, constrained largely by transaction costs and
arbitrage possibilities. And someone excluded from a fungible resource for which there is
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a competitive market would lack standing to complain in court, since the availability of
perfect substitutes would prevent him from suffering an injury in fact.
In the real property context, by contrast, perfect market substitutes for particular
homes and communities do not exist. Hence exclusion might engender real social harms
that cannot be solved by market competition and arbitrage. Moreover, an individual’s
enjoyment of a home may be heavily dependent on the identity of his neighbors, whereas
someone’s enjoyment of a car or dress is only slightly dependent on the identities of
particular individuals who have purchased the same cars or suits. The possibility of
substituting various exclusion strategies for governance, which is practically a
nonsequitur in the context of nonsocial goods such as cars or garments, takes on much
greater importance in the real property context.
My information-asymmetries hypothesis finds support in the economics literature
on tagging. The tagging literature has focused on the problems associated with
government wealth distribution policies, which require the state to distinguish between
those deserving of welfare and imposters who try to obtain welfare payments even
though they are capable of obtaining gainful employment. In a recent study of nineteenthcentury poor laws, Besley, Coate, and Guinnane argue that new informational burdens
brought on by rapid economic change explained the English government’s 1834 mandate
that only citizens who resided in government workhouses would be eligible for
welfare.130 Although building and staffing these workhouses entailed far higher perpauper expenditures than the prior regime of locally dispensed monetary assistance, the
English government nevertheless adopted the workhouse mandate because of its
effectiveness at sorting among the deserving and undeserving poor.131 The sorting device
was effective because life in the workhouse was so unpleasant that no one with other
options would be willing to endure it.132 During earlier epochs, English workers lived and
died in a single county. This stability allowed the state to rely on the local vestry to dole
out welfare, since those officials knew who was destitute because of economic
circumstance and who was a loafer or a drunk.133 But in the early nineteenth century, as
“society became increasingly anonymous and market relations supplanted personal
relations,” this old system broke down.134 Once the government could no longer rely on
the bouncer to sort the deserving from the undeserving, it had to turn to something akin to
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an exclusionary amenity.135 It seems plain that the same kinds of information shocks that
would prompt the government to rethink its sorting strategies in the welfare context
should cause a private resource owner to re-evaluate its exclusion strategies in the
property context.
Before leaving the topic of private information, it is worth mentioning that private
information is a two-way street. There may be, on occasion, a few instances in which the
landowner has private information about the prospective entrants that the entrants
themselves do not possess. Credit-worthiness scores are an example of such private
information. Many landlords check these credit scores before leasing an apartment to a
new tenant,136 and these credit reports may reflect information to which the prospective
tenant herself is not privy.137 In such settings, the resource owner’s strategy is obvious:
He has the relevant information and the right incentives to use it in a way that maximizes
his profit. The landlord will use the bouncer’s right to exclude those prospective tenants
whose credit worthiness is deemed too problematic.
That said, there may be cases in which potential entrants are poor at selfassessing. For instance, we might imagine the delusional introvert who believes she is an
extrovert, or who unrealistically expects to be extroverted if she can just maneuver
herself into the right social setting. This paper’s analysis so far has been premised on the
notion that individuals are almost always better at assessing themselves than third parties
are at assessing them, but readers who do not share that supposition can simply
supplement my model by adding self-assessment as an additional variable. Ceteris
paribus, where self-assessment skills are high, resource owners will be more likely to
employ nontrespass-based exclusion, but in instances where self-assessment skills are
poor, bouncer’s exclusion will become more common.
As a general matter, prospective entrants’ private information will be a concern
more often than a resource owner’s private information. After all, vagueness on the part
of the resource owner may discourage applicants from seeking entry into the relevant
community because they fear being dissatisfied with their fellow resource users or
because they are concerned that they will expend resources in an ultimately futile effort
to gain admission.138 In that respect, then, resource owners will often have an economic
incentive to disclose publicly at least some otherwise private information about the
desired mix of entrants. For example, fraternities and sororities do brand themselves with
niche personalities so as to attract like-minded rushees, and many Greek houses try to
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give hints to those rushees who are unlikely to be admitted as pledges, so that they will
instead spend their time rushing houses to which they seem better suited.139
To summarize, where potential entrants have private information that the
landowner cannot easily discover, it is likely that the landowner will employ a
nontrespass-based exclusion strategy. Where, by contrast, there are few information
asymmetries, the landowner likely will use trespass-based exclusion. In those rare
settings where the resource owner has private information about the would-be entrants,
the owner probably will rely on bouncer’s exclusion.
Although private information will often be the most important factor in
determining which exclusion strategy a resource owner should pursue, it will not be the
only relevant factor. In the discussion that follows, I explore factors that may prove
decisive in particular contexts.
B.

The Nature of the Game

On a conventional economic account, it is not private information that drives the
resource owner’s choice of strategies, but rather the nature of the game. If the game is
structured as a pure coordination game, we should expect to see reliance on the
communication strategies that economists dub “cheap talk.”140 If, on the other hand, the
game is structured as a conflict game, we should expect to see the resource owner relying
on the bouncer’s right, because cheap talk is thought to be relatively ineffective when
potential users of the resource have conflicting and competitive interests vis-à-vis each
other.141 Thus, the conventional economic account, especially the mechanism design
literature, suggests that the nature of the game is the decisive consideration.
The central problem with the conventional account is its unrealistic assumptions,
at least in the real estate setting. The cheap talk model introduced by Farrell and others
suggests that in a game with some conflict, cheap talk will be ignored by rational actors.
But if cheap talk influences some potential purchasers even a little bit, then rational
actors should pay a great deal of attention to it. I argued before that some people will
confuse an exclusionary vibe for an indication that the resource owner intends to exercise
the bouncer’s right to preclude undesired types from entering. If even a few folks make
this mistake in an association that is to be governed by majority rule, then the
development will have the propensity to tip in the direction of desired types, because
rational actors will assume that after the development has been populated the majority (of
desired types) may gang up on the minority (of undesired types) through onerous
governance rules, or exclusionary amenities that tax the undesired without offering them
a commensurate benefit.142 Hence, exclusionary vibes are not exactly the sort of “cheap
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talk” referenced in the economics literature, and in a subdivision that has not embraced
super-majority voting rules, they may well prove up to the task in a game setting
characterized by conflict.
Similarly, it is not obvious that exclusionary vibes will always be the exclusion
mechanism of choice in a pure coordination game. Even in strong seller’s markets for
real estate exclusionary vibes often involve substantial investments of resources.143 In
some settings, the costs of disseminating effective exclusionary vibes may be higher than
the costs associated with exercising the bouncer’s right effectively. The choice among
exclusion strategies will depend on these costs, and the associated benefits.
This analysis shows why it is appropriate to think of resource owners’ actions and
potential entrants’ actions as a repeated game. At time one, private information will drive
the resource owner’s choice of strategies, but this choice of strategies also will affect the
potential for the entrants to take corrective action at time two or thereafter, and this
possibility of subsequent shifting exclusion strategies will alter potential entrants’
incentives at time one. When a resource owner selects an exclusion strategy, she is
simultaneously stacking the deck with respect to future decisions that the entrants will
make about exclusion and governance. Put another way, the owner influences future
governance by controlling present exclusion.
But what if potential entrants understand this dynamic too well, and try to engage
in coordinated action that undermines the resource owners’ objectives? In the real estate
context, block-busting is the most prominent sort of aggressive collective action. Block
busting occurs when real estate agents arrange the sale of a few homes in an ethnically
homogenous neighborhood as a means of triggering panic selling and prompting rapid
neighborhood turnover, thereby obtaining many commissions.144 Buyers may find
participation in endgame block busting advantageous because it may allow them to
purchase more attractive housing stock than they would otherwise be able to afford.
The bouncer’s right provides the best protection against these forms of collective
action. For example, a cooperative apartment board typically exercises the bouncer’s
right with respect to new purchasers,145 and for that reason excels at maintaining the
community’s character. Exclusionary amenities offer the next most robust protection
against collective action of this sort. Existing homeowners in an exclusionary amenity
community may find themselves saddled with substantial debt to pay off the amenity’s
construction, and replacing the amenity with something else after it has been constructed
may prove exceedingly costly or contentious.146 Hence, an exclusionary amenity strategy
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deters opportunistic collective action by raising the costs associated with neighborhood
demographic transition.
Exclusionary vibes, of course, provide an exceedingly poor defense against
collective action. Recall that an exclusionary vibes strategy relies entirely on the
establishment of focal points among those permitted to enter a property. But a group of
like-minded individuals acting in concert could avoid the social or psychological costs
associated with entering a property where one is not wanted. And if enough people ignore
the exclusionary vibe, then members of the pre-existing population will feel like
outsiders, and may decide to move elsewhere.
C.

Law

There will be circumstances in which a developer’s choice of exclusion strategies
is dictated, not by information asymmetries or the nature of the game, but by legal
regimes that favor some forms of exclusion over others. Sometimes the law merely
discourages a particular exclusion strategy. For example, consider the current legal
landscape governing bouncer’s exclusion and exclusionary vibes. The courts
conceptualize the former as a property right and the latter as an expressive right.
Accordingly, government infringements of the bouncer’s right are analyzed, doctrinally,
under takings law, whereas government infringements of the right to emit exclusionary
vibes are analyzed under the First Amendment’s commercial free speech doctrine. Prior
to the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,147
commercial speech was not protected by the First Amendment at all. Since that decision,
however, the Court has gradually expanded commercial speech protections,148 and it
seems plausible that the Court may eventually scrutinize restrictions on commercial
speech with the same framework that it currently applies to core political speech.149 This
ratcheting up of commercial speech protection has coincided with a ratcheting down of
takings protections,150 such that the takings clause, applied properly, seems to have
become a less severe check on the government regulation of exclusion than the First
Amendment. In this environment, we should expect to see the government take advantage
of these arbitrage possibilities by overregulating bouncer’s exclusion and underregulating
exclusionary vibes.151
In other instances, government prohibitions dictate a resource owner’s choice
among exclusionary strategies. The clearest example of this is my suggestion that real
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estate developers may have used golf courses during the 1990s as part of an exclusionary
amenities strategy to promote Caucasian residential homogeneity.152 This behavior
probably did not stem from the presence of private information. In many cases, a
prospective entrant’s race is discernible through visible inspection. But of course, the law
prohibits discriminatory refusals to sell, as well as most race-based exclusionary vibes in
the housing sector. Yet the law leaves exclusionary amenities largely unregulated. Hence
exclusionary vibes are the only lawful racially exclusionary strategies open to real estate
developers.
Note, however, that if what real estate developers are trying to achieve isn’t so
much racial homogeneity as cultural homogeneity (“acting white”), then the golf course
strategy may be explained with reference to information asymmetries. Cultural
orientation may be difficult to discern through short-lived interpersonal interactions.
Suppose that Dan is a member of a minority racial group who feels more comfortable
among members of a majority racial group. Suppose further that a developer seeks to set
up a residential community for members of the majority racial group and could do so
without violating the law. If the developer adopts a bouncer’s right approach to regulating
access, then it is likely that Dan will be excluded from the development, since his racial
status will probably be discerned easily by the bouncer.153 If, on the other hand, the
developer selects an exclusionary vibes approach or an exclusionary amenities approach,
then Dan may well wind up entering the community, since he values the prospect of
living in a community that is comprised overwhelmingly of majority racial group
members and may be willing to pay extra for that “privilege.” Ceteris paribus, we can
expect to find greater heterogeneity in those communities that employ nontrespass-based
exclusion strategies, at least in those instances where the criteria for exclusion can be
applied efficiently by a bouncer (because of a lack of private information). In a dynamic
world, this propensity may trouble homogeneity-preferring prospective entrants enough
to cause them to choose a community that controls access via bouncer’s exclusion.
On the other hand, it may be that what homogeneity-loving prospective
purchasers prefer is not a community that consists entirely of members of a majority
racial group. Rather, they might prefer a community that consists entirely of members
who accept the cultural preferences and practices commonly associated with majority
racial group membership.154 These citizens would prefer to live with Dan, rather than a
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majority-group member who nevertheless embraces minority-group values. Thus, the
critical question concerns what type of homogeneity is demanded by the market. The
answer to that question all boils down to the private information considerations identified
at the outset of this Part. If there is market demand for homogeneity across a dimension
characterized by private information (such as cultural affinity), then the landowner is
likely to employ a nontrespass-based exclusion strategy. If the market demands
homogeneity across a dimension characterized by easily discoverable information (such
as racial status, most of the time), then the landowner is likely to employ a trespass-based
strategy, assuming the law permits him to do so.
D.

Social Meaning

There must be a universe of situations in which a private information story
suggests that a landowner ought to be indifferent as between exercising the bouncer’s
right or exclusionary vibes to achieve a desired level of homogeneity within a new
residential development. In other situations, a private information analysis might suggest
the superiority of one strategy or another, but the magnitude of the difference will not be
particularly great. Under these circumstances, a landowner should pay substantial
attention to the ways in which differing exclusion strategies might carry with them
divergent social meanings.155
Social meanings differ substantially with respect to various exclusion strategies.
Bouncers police popular dance clubs, letting the famous, beautiful, and well-dressed
people enter, and keeping out the less famous, less beautiful, less-well-dressed clientele.
This conduct by nightclub bouncers is relatively uncontroversial.156 But society does not
seem to tolerate bouncers at restaurants, so restaurants seeking to establish an exclusive
atmosphere must rely on blunt exclusion strategies (e.g., high prices or Byzantine
systems for allocating reservations); governance rules (“no smoking,” “no shirt, no shoes,
no service,” or “jacket required”); or exclusionary vibes (via advertising, background
music, or décor choices). Why is blunt exclusion tolerable in one context, but not in
another? The answer plausibly lies in the richness and nature of social interactions among
those who enter the facility. That is to say, patrons can expect to interact substantially in
the dance club, but not in the restaurant. Recognizing this, prevalent social norms tolerate
more obvious forms of exclusion. Moreover, because the parties’ objectives when
interacting with strangers in a dance club will often be romantic, and because
exclusionary interactions based on snap aesthetic judgments are de rigueur in romantic
settings, what would be offensive in the restaurant setting seems perfectly natural at the
entrance to the club.
Where race, religion, gender, or some other suspect classification is used as the
basis for exclusion, the social meaning associated with blatant exclusionary vibes or wellpublicized exercises of the bouncer’s right can be substantial. Members of the public may
be willing to tolerate subtle exclusion far more than obvious exclusion. Hence, in his
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study of exclusionary zoning,157 political scientist James Clingermayer found that
because arguments about excluding the poor and minorities from middle-class and
affluent neighborhoods are politically unpopular, advocates of such separation invoke
nonexclusionary rationales for exclusionary policies.
Therefore, justifications that have exclusionary impacts, whatever the
intent behind them, are generally couched in terms of neighborhood
protection, defense of property values, good planning principles,
enhancing environmental quality, promoting historical preservation, etc.
Sometimes, the justification can even be couched in terms of a need for
more land devoted to industrial purposes. . . . On [some] occasions,
political actors may refer to many values other than the ones that are most
dear to their hearts. In doing so, they shift the terms of the debate and
manipulate the agenda in such a way as to lead to their more preferred
result.158
There is every reason to think that some of the same considerations play out in the
context of exclusionary vibes as in the exclusionary zoning context. To the extent that
landowners seeking to establish or preserve homogeneity in their surroundings exercise
the bouncer’s right, they will point to some criteria less controversial for exclusion than
race or religion. Exclusionary vibes often will be more subtle than usual where the basis
for exclusion is problematic. And exclusionary amenities may be marketed using code
words or proxies for race that are understood by both blacks and whites, but avoid the
more confrontational aspects of overt racial appeals.159
As a general matter, then, the controversial and divisive social meaning of
exclusionary vibes and visible bouncer’s right activities in the racial segregation domain
will help explain the choice of some developers to opt for exclusionary amenity
strategies. And even where the bouncer’s right or exclusionary vibes are employed,
concerns about social meaning and popular backlashes will modify the nature of the
exclusion.160 For example, a landowner excluding some people on the basis of race or
religion may seek out an effective proxy or leave his criteria exceptionally vague. As a
general matter, the more controversy would be generated by an exclusionary criterion, the
more subtle a landowner will be about the existence and content of that criterion.161
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This account of social meaning is, of course, descriptive rather than normative.
From a normative perspective, it is not entirely clear why we should differentiate
between, say, bouncer’s exclusion and exclusionary amenities, if we suppose that the two
strategies would be equally effective at excluding third parties who would like to gain
admittance if the exclusionary policy was eliminated. Moral equivalency seems
particularly appropriate where the landowners intentionally chooses an amenity because
of its anticipated exclusionary effects.
E.

Mistakes

While concerns about controversial social meanings may tempt a landowner to
employ a less transparent criteria for exercising the bouncer’s right, or a less obviously
exclusionary vibe, there is a countervailing concern. The greater the vagueness, the
higher the likelihood that third parties targeted for inclusion or exclusion will make
errors. These mistakes will arise when parties targeted for inclusion or exclusion fail to
realize it. Such errors impose costs on the landowner.162
Vagueness in the exclusionary criteria behind bouncer’s exclusion will be costly
for the landowner in that it will force her to spend substantial time and resources turning
away those who do not meet the criteria. While this turning away of people targeted for
exclusion may be valuable in some sense for the resource owner,163 much of this effort
will be of little utility to her. Moreover, if the owner repeatedly turns away third parties
without identifying any applicable criteria for entry, she runs the risk that those excluded
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will become frustrated by having expended resources in a futile effort, and will engage in
violent self help against the landlord as a result.
Dampening or ambiguating the message contained in an exclusionary vibe
imposes a different set of costs on the landowner. Recall that through exclusionary vibes,
the landlord expects to command some sort of premium by virtue of his successful effort
to establish a focal point around which similar people can organize themselves. But the
less obvious the exclusionary message, the less confident prospective purchasers or
entrants will be in the success of the landowners’ effort to establish a focal point.
Moreover, some prospective purchasers or entrants may not realize that they are targeted
for inclusion by the landowners’ message, and this will depress the size of the market,
thereby further reducing the premium that the landowner can expect to command.164
Indeed, as a general matter, we can expect to find a higher percentage of “tone-deaf”
entrants in communities whose access is regulated by exclusionary vibes than in those in
which a bouncer restricts entry. Because some prospective purchasers or entrants will fail
to understand the content of an exclusionary vibe, there may be a substantial portion of
the population targeted for exclusion that nevertheless purchases access to the
landowners’ community. Most of these people will realize that they failed to perceive an
exclusionary message in hindsight, and their lack of fit with their neighbors may trigger
either buyers’ remorse – with rapid and costly turnover in homes as they decide to move
to a community where people are more like them – or efforts to undermine the
community’s homogeneity from within – which may trigger the exodus of those
homeowners who purchased after correctly perceiving the content of the exclusionary
vibe.
The same sort of mistakes can occur in the exclusionary amenities setting. Here
the problems arise if a potential purchaser or renter underestimates the expenses
associated with a costly, polarizing amenity. For example, in the rental environment, a
prospective tenant may not know how much of his monthly rent payment is used to
subsidize an adjacent amenity. The renter can probably rely on educated guesses here,
however, and use the amenity’s apparent quality as a proxy for its monthly costs. In a
homeowners association or condominium association, mistake costs will be lower, both
because a prospective purchaser will have access to a budget specifying association
expenses by line item, and because the prospective purchaser who plans to live in a
residence for many years will probably invest more time than the transient renter in
discerning where his assessment dollars will be going.

III.

Societal Considerations in Regulating Owners’ Exclusion
Strategies

The previous section analyzed the important variables that affect a resource
owner’s decision to choose among the three primary exclusion strategies. With a few
exceptions, we can expect that resource owners will act to maximize their private welfare
in restricting access to their property. Of course, resource owners’ decisions about
exclusion necessarily affect the interests of third parties, and may implicate broader
societal values as well. Where a resource owner’s exclusion of third parties generates
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substantial negative externalities, intervention by the state may be warranted.165 In this
part, I will explore some of the social considerations that ought to guide the law’s
response to various exclusion strategies. I will also point to various ways in which the
law, consciously or not, alters the incentives for individual resource owners to engage in
particular forms of exclusion.
A.

Symbolic Externalities

As alluded to earlier, certain forms of residential exclusion are highly
controversial. Exclusionary actions by a landowner might upset prospective purchasers or
tenants, who would like to enter the landowners’ property but are deterred or prevented
from doing so. Such actions might also impose genuinely felt harms on people who have
no interest in entering the landowners’ problem but object to the exclusionary device all
the same. These sentiments might arise among bystanders because they feel special
kinship with the disappointed group of prospective entrants, or because they resent the
exclusionary device as a matter of principle.
As an exclusionary device becomes increasingly obvious, we might expect that
these bystanders will become increasingly offended by its use. This analysis suggests that
exclusionary vibes may prove particularly problematic. After all, exclusionary vibes
necessitate some form of advertising visible to third parties as a means of enticing
compatible people to enter the property in question. While savvy landowners will work
hard to target their advertisements to a receptive audience by selecting the media outlets
thought to provide the most sympathetic eyeballs, there will inevitably be some
disclosure of an exclusionary message to people who will be offended by such a message.
From a social welfare perspective, bouncer’s exclusion and exclusionary
amenities will be better strategies in circumstances where large numbers of people object
to the exclusion that is occurring. It might be difficult for bystanders to learn that a
landowner is exercising the bouncer’s right in a controversial or problematic manner,
unless the landowner for some reason publicizes this fact. Similarly, one of the
advantages of exclusionary amenities is that they can sort people in subtle ways and that
subtlety keeps exclusionary amenities off the radar screens of many bystanders.
B.

Misperception Externalities

I have already pointed to the possibility that exclusionary vibes might be
misunderstood by third parties seeking entry onto a particular property.166 Not all of this
misperception amounts to an externality, however, since the landowner will suffer
economic repercussions if too few people understand his exclusionary message. One set
of externalities consists of the costs imposed on prospective purchasers or tenants, who
are forced to relocate or experience regret after they learn that the property differs from
their expectations. A second set of externalities arises when third parties reach mistaken
conclusions based on the messages implicit in a landowners’ choice of exclusion
strategies.
Misperception externalities of the first sort will be minimized in instances where
the resource owner opts for bouncer’s exclusion or exclusionary amenities instead. In the
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bouncer’s exclusion case, the prospective purchaser’s misperception is ordinarily
irrelevant, since the bouncer will prevent the mistaken third party from entering the
property in any event. In the exclusionary amenities setting, misperception externalities
might arise if an individual finds a particular amenity attractive, but finds the residential
homogeneity that is created by the amenity surprising and unattractive. As a general
matter, these forms of misperception will be rare since people who value costly social
amenities enough to buy homes that include them usually have some prior exposure to
the demographics of that amenity’s user base.
Misperception externalities of the second sort also will be most prominent in the
exclusionary vibes setting. Indeed, two separate circuit courts have explained the Fair
Housing Act’s peculiar treatment of Mrs. Murphy homeowners with reference to these
sorts of externalities. Recall that the FHA permits mom-and-pop landlords to refuse to
rent a unit based on discriminatory criteria, but does not permit those landlords to
advertise their discriminatory criteria and renders newspapers liable for any
discriminatory advertisements that run in their pages.167
The Fourth Circuit has defended the Mrs. Murphy exception by noting that
Congress might have worried that potential renters would assume, falsely, that if one
apartment in a Mrs. Murphy building was advertised as being “for whites only” many
other apartments in larger buildings (which are subject to FHA restrictions on the
bouncer’s right) were also available only to whites.168 The D.C. Circuit has embraced
somewhat different logic, noting in the standing context that permitting Mrs. Murphy
landlords to publish discriminatory advertisements “created a public impression that
segregation in housing is legal, thus facilitating discrimination by . . . other property
owners and requiring a consequent increase in [civil rights] organizations’ educational
programs on the illegality of housing discrimination.”169 Both these courts correctly
pointed out the possibility that members of the public might draw erroneous conclusions
that undermine public policy objectives if Mrs. Murphy landlords are permitted to
advertise their ability to discriminate against tenants without violating the FHA.
Relatedly, other scholarship has suggested that racially exclusionary advertisements
perpetuate unflattering stereotypes about the excluded groups or stimulate demand for
racial homogeneity among members of majority groups.170
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Given the Supreme Court’s increasing hostility to various restrictions on
commercial speech,171 it is not clear whether these earlier circuit court decisions remain
good law. Most likely, the doctrinal answer would hinge on whether discriminatory
advertisements by Mrs. Murphy landlords qualify as “misleading” statements for the
purposes of the Supreme Court’s Central Hudson test.172 But what is most interesting
about the decisions is the recognition by both courts that exclusionary vibes could be
powerful and overbroad influencers of decisions as important to individuals as the
question of where to live.
C.

Liberty Externalities

Free-market societies pride themselves on offering their citizens a wide array of
choices, and the variety of homes available in most industrialized societies reflects the
diversity of preferences along that dimension. Still, there are constraints on citizen
mobility, and many people face very high social or economic costs if they are forced to
relocate to another community. Within a given metropolitan area, there may be few, if
any, close substitutes for particular residential communities. Under such circumstances, a
resource owners’ decision to exclude third parties may impose substantial restrictions on
the liberty of those excluded. Bouncer’s exclusion regimes that are based on immutable
characteristics will be particularly problematic in that respect, since excluded third parties
will not be able to gain admission to the property in question by altering their behaviors
or preferences. Compared to bouncer’s exclusion, exclusionary amenities and
exclusionary vibes score well on this front. Someone who the resource owner has
targeted for exclusion can circumvent the resource owner’s wishes, either by absorbing
the costs of being an outlier, or by paying for a costly amenity that he does not value
highly.
There is a particularly troubling form of the liberty externality, best dubbed the
“dumping grounds” problem. The concern here is that there will be some types of people
who are so universally loathed and economically disadvantaged that they are denied
effective choice among some subdivisions, and come to be concentrated in the few
communities that are willing to accept them or unable to keep them out. In twenty-first
century America, sex offenders seem to represent the least desirable neighbors of all.
Perhaps puzzlingly, they have been singled out for harsher post-release restrictions than
murderers.
If this particular dumping grounds problem worsens in the future, courts may
crack down on exclusion rights. After refusing to enjoin a homeowners association ban
on sales to sex offenders, the court in Mulligan v. Panther Valley Property Owners
Association warned that it might well change its mind in the future if too many
homeowners associations followed Panther Valley’s lead, such that “large segments of
the State could entirely close their doors to such individuals, confining them to a narrow
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corridor.”173 Courts considering limitations on other forms of exclusion by landowners
have embraced similar reasoning and voiced analogous misgivings about unduly
constraining the choices of third parties subject to exclusion.174
D.

Mechanisms for Selective Regulation of Exclusion Rights

In symbolic externalities, misperception externalities, and liberty externalities, I
have identified three possible considerations that may warrant government restrictions on
certain exclusion rights, even in those instances where one suspects the resource owner’s
decision to exclude maximizes his private welfare. When the government does elect to
intervene, there are essentially two kinds of strategies available.
First, the government might attempt direct regulation of the various rights to
exclude. So far, we have already seen various efforts along these lines: Restrictions on
the exclusionary vibe, but not the exclusionary amenity or bouncer’s exclusion in the
Mrs. Murphy context; restrictions on bouncer’s exclusion and exclusionary vibes but not
exclusionary amenities in most other fair housing-related contexts; requirements for
simultaneous bouncer’s exclusion and exclusionary vibes in the adverse possession
context; and administrative crackdowns on exclusionary vibe “bluffs” in the beachfront
public trust context. These “hard shove” legal strategies are straightforward enough.175
The government permits activities that it is willing to tolerate and prohibits those forms
of exclusion that it deems harmful to social welfare.
Less obvious are the ways in which government information policy can alter the
incentives for private parties to adopt various exclusion strategies. Yet these information
173
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policies may be just as powerful as governmental prohibitions in shaping the incentives
of private parties to adopt particular exclusion strategies. As I shall argue below, many
governmental policies, such as privacy tort laws, as well as government publication
outlets like Megan’s Law and FOIA, and government subsidies for the Internet and other
information technologies, alter parties’ incentives to exclude. Because the presence or
absence of private information is so critical in determining what exclusion strategy a
party adopts, “gentle nudge” government policies that affect the costs of obtaining private
information may spark dramatic shifts in the ways that resource owners order their
affairs. More provocatively, where concerns about negative externalities associated with
exclusion are prominent, prohibitions on worrisome forms of exclusion are not the only
way to go. Rather, the government might more effectively discourage undesirable forms
of exclusion by tweaking information policy.
E.

Applications

The foregoing analysis provides an analytical framework that explains why
landowners choose one exclusion strategy over another, and why the state sometimes
regulates some exclusion strategies but not others. So let us apply this framework to a
few real world cases.
1.

Sex Offenders

Sensitivity to government information policy helps us understand the recent
popularity of homeowners associations restrictions on sex offender residency. Prior to the
enactment of Megan’s Law, it was difficult for a landlord or real estate developer to learn
whether a prospective resident was a convicted sex offender. New Jersey initiated the
Megan’s Law trend in 1994, and every state eventually followed suit, prompted in part by
congressional legislation that gave the states very strong incentives to adopt their own
versions of Megan’s Law.176
The key part of various Megan’s Laws is the Internet registry provision. Almost
every state now publishes a list of its sex offenders on the Internet.177 Many of these
internet registries do not restrict access in any meaningful way and do not charge for
access.178 In recent months, efforts have been undertaken to nationalize the database in a
176
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way that will allow for the easy tracking of sex offenders who move interstate.179 These
days, then, someone’s status as a convicted sex offender is hardly private, in that a
landlord or developer can obtain this information about a potential entrant almost
costlessly.180
My account of exclusion suggests that as the government reduces the extent to
which sex offender status is private information, those interested in excluding sex
offenders will rely increasingly on bouncer’s exclusion. This is borne out by recent
events. Indeed, prior to the enactment of Megan’s Law, sex offender exclusions were
practically unknown in common interest communities, but they appear to have
proliferated in recent years. Rather, common interest communities tried to keep sex
offenders out by holding meetings designed to raise awareness about the threats posed by
sex offenders and then publicizing those meetings to the community at large, or used
Neighborhood Watch signs and meetings as a means of signaling sex offenders and other
criminals that they were not welcome.181 Megan’s Law, then, may have caused
homeowners associations to substitute bouncer’s exclusion for exclusionary vibes.
What’s particularly revealing about the proliferation of sex offender residency
restrictions is the relationship between homeowners associations’ restrictions on sex
offenders and those same associations’ lack of restrictions on potential purchasers who
have committed even more serious crimes (such as murder) or crimes more likely to
target proximate strangers (such as burglary and automobile theft). Perhaps the most
important explanation for this disparity is the lack of readily available Megan’s Law-style
lists for murderers. If this information was available for free, we would expect to see
significant numbers of homeowners associations prohibiting the sale of units to
murderers, burglars, and car thieves as well.182
I do not mean to suggest that state governments enacted Megan’s Law because
they wanted to encourage a shift to bouncer’s exclusion in the sex offender context. I
actually suspect that exclusion regimes were not on the minds of the relevant elected
officials at the time. But this analysis of Megan’s Law underscores the possibility that
government information policy might function as an alternative mechanism for
<http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2005/10/why_volokh_is_w.html> (visited Oct. 12, 2005)
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influencing the extent to which private parties pursue particular exclusion strategies.
Where there are public policy rationales for favoring bouncer’s exclusion over
exclusionary vibes, but restricting exclusionary vibes is problematic in other dimensions
– perhaps because of First Amendment limitations – the government can accomplish its
goal by collecting and publishing the applicable private information.
Alternatively, the government might subsidize private enterprise to disseminate
previously private information more widely. This has happened in the past, but only
indirectly. For example, the United States government substantially subsidized the
creation of the Internet through the Department of Defense.183 The Internet gave rise to
Google, which has dramatically lowered the costs associated with aggregating public but
obscure information about individuals. Google’s search and rating technologies lower the
costs for developers and landlords to engage in bouncer’s exclusion across a host of
different criteria. Indeed, more recently, the Internet has facilitated the development of
Friendster184 and other social networking sites, which by rendering the existence of
individuals’ social ties public, might even allow our hypothetical real estate developer185
to lower the costs of discerning who is an introvert and who is an extrovert.
So far, this analysis has shown how government information policy can shift the
incentives for landlords to use bouncer’s exclusion instead of exclusionary amenities.
Can it work in the opposite direction, to help shift landowners from trespass-based
strategies to nontrespass-based strategies? Absolutely. The body of law that regulates
shifts in this direction is information privacy law. For example, in 1994 Georgia courts
held that it was a tortuous invasion of privacy to disseminate someone’s HIV positive
status without his consent, even if the plaintiff’s HIV status was already known to fifty or
sixty people.186 This ruling had the effect of making it more difficult for landowners to
discover whether a prospective purchaser or tenant was HIV positive, and inhibited
bouncer’s exclusion of HIV positive individuals. To the extent that landowners still
wanted to exclude HIV positive individuals from their property, they would likely have to
resort to exclusionary vibes.
Statutory privacy protections can have the same incentive-shifting consequences.
For instance, in 1970, Congress enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act.187 The Act limits
the information that credit reporting agencies can provide about individuals. Section
1681c(a) of the Act prohibits credit reporting agencies from providing a landlord with
information about any bankruptcy proceedings involving a prospective tenant that are
more than ten years old, or any civil suits, judgments, or criminal convictions that are
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more than seven years old.188 By obscuring information that a landlord might use to weed
out tenants with potentially problematic backgrounds or credit histories, this law gave
landlords incentives to substitute toward exclusionary vibes, or, more likely, onerous
governance regimes, such as resort to summary evictions and increased surveillance in
common areas. State legislation designed to prevent landlords from blacklisting
prospective tenants on the basis of landlord-tenant suits in which the tenants were the
prevailing party likely would have shifted landlords’ incentives in similar ways.189
2.

Racial Discrimination in Rental Housing

Since the mid 1960s, the federal government has committed substantial resources
to preventing landlords from engaging in racist behavior that promotes racial residential
segregation. These efforts, combined with less vigorous fair housing enforcement efforts
by the states, have probably contributed to declining racial segregation over the past two
decades, although other economic and demographic factors no doubt have played a
part.190
In the realm of racial discrimination, it appears that the law treats exclusionary
vibes with great hostility, treats bouncer’s exclusion with substantial hostility, and leaves
exclusionary amenity strategies largely unregulated. The law’s permissive attitude toward
exclusionary amenities probably reflects ignorance about a strategy that has only recently
been discussed in the legal literature. The relationship between bouncer’s exclusion and
exclusionary vibes might indicate a predominant concern with the symbolic harms
associated with racial discrimination, where discriminatory statements and messages are
conceptualized as a kind of hate speech, but discriminatory outcomes are tolerated if they
are shrouded behind sufficiently polite messages that obscure a discriminatory objective.
While exclusionary vibes engender more misperception and symbolic externalities than
bouncer’s exclusion, the greater liberty externalities associated with bouncer’s exclusion
seem especially troublesome. Here, I suspect that the law’s hand’s off approach to
bouncer’s exclusion in certain contexts is only partially tied to the symbolic harms that
are magnified by exclusionary vibes. A fuller explanation for the Fair Housing Act’s
hierarchy no doubt stems from the fact that discriminatory exclusionary vibes are much
easier to detect than discriminatory bouncer’s exclusion, particularly in those instances
where a landlord rents out only a few units, and random statistical variation conceivably
explains segregation within the landlord’s building.191 In short, it may well be that the
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costs of enforcement efforts by the state explain the law’s attitude toward bouncer’s
exclusion in the racial segregation context.
In the context of racial discrimination, the law has relied heavily on selective
prohibitions on the exercise of certain rights to exclude. By and large, the law has not
tried to shift the incentives for private parties to adopt particular exclusion strategies
through information policy. The explanation for this is fairly straightforward, in that most
apartment rentals involve face-to-face interactions between landlords and prospective
tenants, and through these interactions, landlords can easily discover the racial affiliation
of most potential tenants.192 At present, it would be difficult for government
policymakers to render the racial status of a prospective tenants private information. In
order to do so, the law would have to prevent face-to-face encounters between landlords
and tenants, which seems impractical since tenants probably will want to see the premises
before putting down a deposit, and may well want to evaluate the character of the
landlord as well. Moreover, even eliminating face-to-face interactions might not solve the
problem, since racial identity can often be assessed somewhat accurately with reference
to the prospective tenant’s name. At present, then, information policy strategies for
altering landlord exclusion incentives would require a cumbersome administrative
apparatus and deprive both landlords and tenants of justifiably relevant information
regarding an important transaction. In future decades, as Internet listings for real estate
rentals and sales become increasingly sophisticated, and communications technologies
advance, information policy may provide an increasingly attractive avenue for altering
landlords’ and developers’ incentives.
3.

Religious Exclusion in Housing

Theosophical Community v. Silver,193 typifies the effort to replace governance
with bouncer’s exclusion in a residential community. The Theosophical Society is not
technically a religion.194 Rather, it is an association with “three basic objectives: to work
towards the universal brotherhood of man; to study and to compare religions, sciences,
and philosophies, and . . . to explore the psychical powers latent in man.”195 There were
approximately 6000 members of the Theosophical Society living in the United States
during the pendency of the litigation.196
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In 1967, a nonprofit corporation purchased two tracts of land in California for the
purpose of founding a retirement community for Theosophists.197 To that end, the
corporation recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CCRs) limiting ownership
and occupancy of land within the community to persons aged 50 or over who had been
members of the Theosophical Society for more than 3 years.198 The CCRs gave Taormina
a right of first refusal to prevent transfers of property within the community that would
violate the occupancy or ownership limitations. Note the coupling of a bouncer’s right
with reliance on readily verifiable information (age and membership in an affiliated
association).199 The Silvers bought land in the community with actual knowledge of these
CCRs.200 As Robert Silver was under 50 years of age and Esther Silver had not been a
Theosophist for the requisite three years, Taormina invoked its right of first refusal.
Because Theosophy was not a religion, the trial court held that the CCRs did not
directly violate any housing discrimination laws.201 The appellate court, however, found
that the restrictions on religion did violate the purpose of the antidiscrimination laws,
thereby warranting the court’s refusal to enforce the occupancy restriction on equitable
grounds.202 The more interesting part of the opinion dealt with the ownership restrictions.
The appellate court invalidated Taormina’s as an unreasonable restraint on alienation:
In determining whether a restraint is unreasonable, the court must balance
the justification for the restriction against the quantum of the restraint. . . .
On balance, we find that the covenant restricting ownership of land
in Taormina to Theosophists older than 50 is unreasonable. The quantum
of restraint in this case is very great. Southern California is a highly
desirable place to live and people from all over the country seek to buy
property here. In contrast to a vast potential market, the number of
Theosophists in the United States is exceptionally small.
The purpose of the restriction is to insure that those who settle in
Taormina are sincere in their commitment to Theosophy. Taormina was
expressly developed as a retirement community for people who share
interests in the study of comparative religions and the latent powers of
men. While the gathering together of like minded people may be a
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laudable goal, such purpose is not sufficient to sustain the heavy burden of
alienability.203
Thus, held the court, the exclusion of so many people from the pool of potential
purchasers of the homes in Taormina rendered the restraint on alienation unpalatable,
however laudable the motivations of the community’s founders.
In economic terms, the members of the Taormina Theosophic Society were trying
to benefit from the network effects associated with bringing together people who share
interests and values. When everyone at a local café, post office, or general store shares an
affiliation with a particular group, the opportunities for conversations of mutual interest
are enhanced. There may be substantial gains from limiting membership in a club to law
school professors,204 Boston Red Sox fans,205 or people with high I.Q.s but middling
accomplishments.206 The imposition of such a membership criteria facilitates
conversation about specialized or advanced topics that would be inaccessible to most
members of the general population.
Of course, that is not the only possible benefit of deferring to the CCRs at issue in
Taormina. It may well be that membership in the Taormina Theosophic Society
correlates strongly with other attributes that may be desirable in a residential setting.
Perhaps Theosophists are perceived to be more honest, more neighborly, more engaged,
or less boisterous than ordinary Americans. If so, selecting for Theosophist membership
might permit a community to devote fewer resources to the kinds of governance regimes
necessary to settle disagreements, prevent litigation, encourage civic participation, or
regulate noise. Taormina’s ownership and occupancy restrictions thus might engender
first-order benefits, like communities of interest, as well as second-order benefits, like
better neighborly relations. To be sure, however, there will be costs associated with the
Theosophists’ residential homogeneity,207 though in the American context the costs
associated with religious homogeneity are surely lower than the costs associated with
residential racial segregation.208
Once Taormina is barred from enforcing its covenants via bouncer’s exclusion, it
must opt for alternative strategies. Do governance mechanisms allow the community to
capture the aforementioned benefits? It would appear not. Taormina could enact rules
mandating that each resident receive five hours per week of instruction in comparative
religion, science, philosophy, and E.S.P. Fines could be instituted for members who
skipped these classes. Moreover, residents who failed to discuss religion, science,
philosophy, or psychic phenomena in an intelligent manner when invited to do so by a
203
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fellow resident in a public space might face monetary fines. Numerous community rules
could be enacted to encourage neighborliness, civic participation, and quiet coexistence,
including various neighborhood easements, voting inducements, and noise restrictions.
Of course, the community would need to set up a comprehensive governance apparatus to
determine whether residents were violating these rules and to resolve the inevitable
disputes about whether Mr. Silver’s contributions to his neighborhood’s conversations
about Eastern philosophy were sufficiently cogent to ward off a hefty fine. And the rules
will no doubt need to be fine-tuned to prevent people from circumventing their
communal obligations. The limitations on liberty necessary to effectuate such a
community would be quite substantial. The reader, no doubt, sees where this is going. It
is impossible to design a governance regime that will generate the same level of firstorder and second-order benefits as the fine-grained exclusion regime that Taormina
sought to put into place. Any governance regime will be done in by the enormous costs
and complexity associated with designing, interpreting, applying, and enforcing proTheosophic rules.209 In this instance, and no doubt many others, exclusion turns out to be
more precise and far more efficient than governance.210
So what are the options left open to religious orders seeking neighborhood
homogeneity, particularly those that, unlike the Theosophists, are classified as religions
under applicable laws? They must rely on exclusionary vibes and exclusionary amenity
strategies. But exclusionary vibes must be rather subtle, lest an advertising campaign
violate the Fair Housing Act. And the subtler they are, the less homogeneity they will
engender. So, to avoid the problems associated with misperception externalities, religious
organizations are beginning to turn to an exclusionary amenity strategy, whereby all
members of the community must subsidize the creation of a house of worship or religious
university.211 All else being equal, then, efforts to engender religious homogeneity may
result in the diversion of more resources to religion-oriented club goods. Hence a ban on
religious discrimination in residential sales or advertising brings about the creation of
more churches and religious institutions than one might otherwise expect to find.

IV.

Conclusion

Orthodox property scholarship has equated the right to exclude with those rights
that arise under trespass law. This paper has suggested that much can be gained from
thinking about exclusion with a bigger tent approach, one that is sensitive to the ways in
which nontrespass-based exclusion rights substitute for in rem, trespass-based rights.
Such an approach further underscores the extent to which various exclusion strategies can
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prove superior to governance regimes or more dangerous than governance regimes in
instances where the basis for exclusion is problematic.
After identifying a plurality of exclusion strategies, it is natural to ask what
factors cause a landowner to choose one over another. It turns out that the presence or
absence of private information drives many landowner decisions about what exclusion
strategy to adopt. Where third parties seeking to enter property possess private
information about their own preferences, behaviors, and intentions, and the landowner
cannot discover this private information at a low cost, we can expect to see the landowner
employ nontrespass based exclusion strategies. Where there is little private information
involved, or private information can be discovered by the landowner at a low cost, we
can expect to see the landowner employing trespass-based exclusion rights.
Finally, when externalities warrant government intervention to regulate a
landowners’ choice among exclusion strategies, there are two strategies the government
might pursue. First, the government can engage in hard-shove strategies, where the
government prohibits some forms of exclusion and permits other forms of exclusion. This
is the strategy the government has adopted in the housing discrimination arena.
Alternatively, the government can opt for gentle nudges; strategies that alter the
incentives of landowners by making various types of exclusion more or less attractive.
Megan’s Law is the most prominent and far-reaching example of the “gentle nudge”
approach, although many aspects of information privacy law affect landowner incentives
in much the same way. What unifies these strategies is the government’s ability to
regulate exclusion indirectly, through its control over information access policy. By
rendering private information public or public information private, the state can alter,
sometimes radically, the mix of exclusion strategies that landowners employ.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Lior Strahilevitz
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
lior@uchicago.edu
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